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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: ITS
NATURE, SOURCES AND STATUS AS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES
Jordan J. Paust *
Customary international law is one of the primary components of
law in the international legal process, a dynamic process profoundly
interconnected with our own domestic legal processes for at least the
last 250 years. In our history, customary international law has also
been received as part of the "law of nations," a phrase used inter-
changeably by our courts with the phrase "international law" from the
dawn of the United States.' What, more particularly, has been the
perceived nature of customary international law in the United States?
Despite much theoretical discussion (usually without adequate atten-
tion to actual trends in judicial decision), what have been recognizable
sources or evidences of that law and its components? What constitu-
tional bases exist for the incorporation of customary international law,
and what sorts of status are possible? These and related questions are
explored below.
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF CUSTOMARY LAW
In one of the earliest of our Supreme Court opinions, it was recog-
nized that the customary law of nations is human law "established by
the general consent of mankind."' 2 Such a recognition has generally
been echoed in subsequent Supreme Court opinions: "founded on the
common consent as well as the common sense of the world;"' 3 the
* Professor of Law, University of Houston. A.B. (1965), J.D. (1968), U.C.L.A.; LL.M.
(1972), University of Virginia; J.S.D. Cand., Yale University (Ford Fndn. Fellow 1973-1975);
Fulbright Professor, University of Salzburg (1978-1979).
1. See Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and International
Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393,
420-21 n.55 (1988).
2. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227 (1796); see also United States v. Darnaud, 25 F.
Cas. 754, 760 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 14,918) ("[Mlankind recognize... mankind concur
in... the general sense of mankind ... ").
3. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863). See also Dooley v. United States, 182
U.S. 222, 231 (1901) ("[E]stablished by the usage of the world;..."); United States v. Robins, 27
F. Cas. 825, 861 note (D.C.D. So. Car. 1799) (No. 16,175) (Statement of Rep. Marshall)(I[T]he
practice of every nation in the universe; and consequently the opinion of the world .. "); Berg-
man v. De Sieyes, 71 F.Supp. 334, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1946)("The law of nations, like other systems
of law, is progressive. Its principles are expanded and liberalized by the spirit of the age and
country in which we live." (quoting Holbrook, Nelson & Co. v. Henderson, 6 N.Y. Super. Ct.
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"generally accepted" and "common consent of mankind."'4 Even ear-
lier in England it was recognized by Blackstone that "[t]he law of na-
619, 631-32 (1839))), aff'd, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir 1948); cf. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F.Supp. 389,
406-07 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), quoting M. FRANKEL & E. SAIDEMAN, OUT OF THE SHADOWS OF
NIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (1989) ("[G]enerated
by.. .beliefs of the civilized people of the world."); but see United States v. One Hundred Barrels
of Cement, 27 F. Cas. 292, 298 (D.C.E.D. Mo. 1862) (No. 15,945) ("[T]he so-called public opin-
ion of the world... is no more the law of nations than is popular opinion at home the municpal
law. Public opinion, ever shifting, cannot be substituted by courts for constitutions and statute
books."). With respect to the last quoted remark, it is true, of course, that patterns of relevant
expectation are but one element of customary law and are not "law" in themselves. It would also
be true that mere "public opinion" or "popular opinion" is insufficient. As explained in the text
following note 6, infra, the subjective element of customary law involves a more particular set of
expectations, i.e., expectations that something is legally appropriate or required, opiniojuris or
"acceptance" as law. See also text at notes 12-13, infra. Consider also DIG. JUL. I. 3.32 ("[S]ince
leges themselves are binding on us for no other reason than that they been received by the judg-
ment of the people, it is proper that those [legal] things of which the people have approved
without any writing shall also be binding on everyone.").
4. The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1871); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 210, 225 (1840)(argument of counsel). See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694,
700-01, 707-08, 711 (1900); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 115, 119, 121 (1825); Paust,
Letter, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 601 (1978); cf. Johnson v. Twenty-one Bales, 13 F. Cas. 855, 857
("[M]odified, in the progress of time, by the tacit or express consent... of nations. . . every
civilized people .... ), 860 ("[T]he sanction of the civilized world .... ) (C.C.D. N.Y. 1814)
(No. 7,417); Lopes v. Schroder, 225 F.Supp. 292, 296 n.19 (E.D. Pa. 1963)("[L]aw of nations...
recognized by the common consent of nations." (quoting 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 56 (1833))). The word "nation" is used to refer to a
relevant group of people and its meaning is quite different from that attributed to the term
"State." See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 118-19 (5th ed. 1955); H. WHEATON, ELE-
MENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (2d ed. 1880); United States v. Kusche, 56 F.Supp. 201, 207
(S.D. Cal. 1944).
For relevant decisions at the international level, see, e.g., Concerning Military and Paramili-
tary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. paras. 176-192, 202-03,
207, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023, 1063-67, 1069-71 (1986); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
1969 I.C.J. 4, 41, 44; id. at 229-31 (Lachs, J., dissenting); Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v.
Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 148-49; United States v. von Leeb, I 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 462,
487-88, 490 (1950) ("Since international common law grows out of the common reactions and
the composite thinking. . . it is pertinent to consider the general attitude of the citizens of
states.., the general and considered opinions of the people within states-the source from which
international common law springs .... the composite thinking in the international community,
for it is by such democratic processes that [international] common law comes into being."); Judg-
ment and Sentences, International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L
L. 172, 219-20 (1947). See also L. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 361-62 (1989); H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 120 (reprint 1968); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L.
CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 74, 80 n.208, 81, 88-9, 207-16, 413, 416,
471 (1980); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & 1. VLASiC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE
116-17 (1963). The 1907 Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land contained an early recognition that the "law of nations" results "from the usages estab-
lished among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public
conscience." Oct. 18, 1907, preamble, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 94 (XCIV) L.N.T.S. No. 2138
(emphasis added), quoted in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942); Cobb v. United States, 191
F.2d 604, 611 n.30 (9th Cir. 1951); Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F.Supp. 602, 614 (D. Utah 1951).
Such language was repeated in common articles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (e.g., Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
158, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287) and was repeated in part in more recent
treaties addressing the law of armed conflict or humanitarian law. See, e.g., Meron, The Geneva
Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 352 n.13, 364-65 n.52 (1987).
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tions is a system of rules. . . established by universal consent among
the civilized inhabitants of the world" and "all the people." 5 And still
today the Statute of the International Court of Justice equates custom-
ary international law with "general practice accepted as law."' 6 As the
latter definition affirms, customary international law actually has two
primary components which must generally be conjoined: (1) patterns
of practice or behavior, and (2) patterns of legal expectation, "accept-
ance" as law, or opinio juris. It is this last component, the subjective
element, which seems to have been stressed most often, but both ele-
ments are necessary for the formation and continued validity of a cus-
tomary norm.
There are several significant points evident even in such a meager
documentation of relevant trends in legal decision. First, contrary to
false myth perpetuated in the early twentieth century, the subjective
element of customary international law (i.e., opiniojuris) is to be gath-
ered from patterns of generally shared legal expectation among hu-
mankind, not merely among official State elites. 7 The acceptance "as
law" to which the Statute of the International Court refers is actually
a dynamic process of "acceptance" or expectation among human be-
ings. Significantly, the language of the Statute does not contain any
reference to the State or to any other formal institutional arrange-
5. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 66 (1765). See also H.
GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACis LIBRI TRES, preface, sec. 40; bk. I, ch. I, pt. XIV; bk. II, ch.
XIX, pt. I (1625)(Carnegie Endowment trans. 1925); H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 120 (1968); Murray v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 62 F. 24, 31 (C.C.N.D.
Iowa 1894) (Laws of nations were among "the possessions of the people" at the time of the
formation of the Constitution.).
6. Statute of the Court, art. 38(1)(b), 1977 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 77. See also supra note 4. On
the difference between long-term practice and customary law, see also Paust, supra note 1, at 422
n.57, 429 n.74.
7. See supra notes 2-5; Raman, Toward a General Theory of International Customary Law, in
TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 365, 366, 369, 372, 375, 378-81, 384-86, 388
(W. Reisman & B. Weston eds. 1976); cf Rowles, Military Responses to Terrorism: Substantive
and Procedural Constraints in International Law, 81 PROC., AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 307, 315, 317
(1987); but see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2), Comments b and c, Reporters' Note 2 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; J.
BRIERLY, supra note 4, at 60-62; T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 22 (2d ed. 1990); A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 33-
34, 40, 87-88, 194, 197, 269 (1971); L. HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUs COGENS) IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 226-27 (1988); M. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
36 (1988); G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 114, 123-24, 137, 142, 249 (W. Butler
trans. 1974); D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101, 102
(1987); Kelly, The Changing Process of International Law and the Role of the World Court, I I
MICH. J. INT'L L. 129, 143, 145, 151 ("[S]tate practice" focus is indeed "the triumph of positiv-
ism, because it is formed by the observable acts of states that are responsible for its creation."),
164 (1989); Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665,
669, 679, 709-11 (1986); see infra note 15. On the RESTATEMENT'S state-centric viewpoint, see
Falk, Conceptual Foundations, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 439, 452 (1989); see also M. McDOUGAL, H.
LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 73-74, 88-89, 96-107, 161-79, 413.
Fall 1990]
Michigan Journal of International Law
ment,8 and thus the process of acceptance to which the Statute refers
is not to be measured merely by a documented acceptance among offi-
cial elites or those representing "the State" any more than it had been
at the birth of our Constitution. The expectations of all human beings
("mankind," "the world," "the people") are not only relevant but they
also provide the ultimate criterial referent.
Indeed, no other ultimate referent would be realistic, since all
human beings recognizably participate in such a process of acceptance
and the shaping of attitudes whether or not such participation is actu-
ally recognized by each individual or is as effective as it might other-
wise be (e.g., even if apathetic "inaction" is the form of participation
for some, a form that simply allows others a more significant role). 9 It
is this ultimate referent, moreover, that provides customary law with a
built-in basis for its own general efficacy, resting as it does on actual
patterns of generally shared legal expectation, and with a claim to be-
ing the most democratic form of international law.' 0 Born more di-
8. See supra note 6; Raman, supra note 7, at 377-78 ("It is not without significance that
paragraph (b) of Article 38(1) of the Statute... is silent as to 'whose' behavior the decisionmaker
should take into account .... ). This is in sharp contrast to subsections (a) and (c) which refer to
"states" and "nations." Significantly also, the United Nations Charter, of which the Statute is
"an integral part" (U.N. Charter, arts. 92; see also id. at art. 93(1)), was proclaimed in the name
of "the Peoples of the United Nations." U.N. Charter, preamble (emphasis added). See also
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR at 71, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948) ("[T]he conscience of mankind,. . . aspiration of the common people ..
peoples... have in the Charter reaffirmed... [and] standard... for all peoples and all nations.").
9. See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About International Law. Prologue to a
Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188, 193 (1968); McDougal, Remarks at the Pro-
ceedings of the 75th Anniversary Convocation of the American Society of International Law, 75
PROC., AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 198-99 (1981); Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of
Communication, 75 PROc., AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 101, 106-07, 109 (1981). See also Raman, supra
note 7, at 390-91; notes 30-31 infra. Actors may also have a more significant role in any given
social context because of relatively higher respect, power, enlightenment, skill, wealth and so
forth; but such relative outcomes (or "value positions" at any given moment) are tied to the
dynamics of the social process in which all participate, however directly or indirectly or seem-
ingly integrated, dominated or alienated. The same can be said of state actors, including the
judiciary. See also Ferrari-Bravo, Methodes de Recherche de la Coutume Internationale dans la
Pratique des Etats, 192 RECUEIL DES COURs 233, 246-47 ([1985 III] 1986).
If some had become less than attentive to this general truism (relevant also to the "process of
review," see infra note 30), it was brought forcibly to the forefront at the end of the 1980s by the
people, the common and creative people, of the Philippines, Poland, East Germany, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia and Romania. See also Burley, Essay: Revolution of the Spirit, 3 HARV. H.R.J. 1
(1990). And if scholars project merely their personal needs and insecurities onto perceived
processes of customary law, they will miss other needs, interests, objectives, expectations and
forms of participation and interaffectation. They might be blind to normative detail evident in
actual patterns of expectation, to the actual strength of customary norms and to opportunities for
refinement and change of normative content.
10. See United States v. von Leeb, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 462, 487-88, 490 (1950);
Raman, supra note 7, at 366, 378 ("Custom is believed to be the most democratic form of law-
making because all whose interests are affected-irrespective of their formal authority or sta-
tus-can participate in it."); but see Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1108 (1990) (cf. id. at 1187). Those of
less than a democratic orientation and those of a relatively rigid positivist orientation may tend
[Vol. 12:59
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rectly of real authority and strength, it is likely to be more directly
authoritative in particular social contexts. Indeed customary law, rest-
ing as it does upon the authority and practice of all, is undaunting in
its force, uncircumscribed by a minority of elites.
Of further significance is the fact that relevant patterns of legal
expectation, perhaps contrary to Blackstone, need only be generally
shared in the international community. Universality or unanimity are
not required." Yet, for fuller exposition and understanding it is sug-
gested that the researcher identify not merely how widespread a par-
ticular pattern of expectation is or has been, but also how intensely
held or demanded a particular norm is or has been within the commu-
nity.1 2 Awareness of the degree and intensity of general acceptance
to disagree or to prefer treaties as the highest form of international law, treaties, that is, to which
they consent. See also Reisman, supra note 9, at 107 (Re: opposition to "this democratization of
prescription"). Perhaps alternatively, they may only prefer "custom" to which they consent or
which has been applied by their domestic elites. See The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Ct.
1925) (Dictum)("International practice is law only in so far as we adopt it .. " Same re:
"comity"); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 494 F.Supp. 1161, 1180 n.42
(E.D. Pa. 1980); Arroyo v. M/V Island Queen II, 259 F.Supp. 15, 16 (D.P.R. 1966) (dictum)
("The law maritime.., like all international law, ... is applicable within a nation only in so far as
that nation has incorporated the international law into its own law."); West Rand Central Gold
Mining Co. v. The King, [1905] 2 K.B. 391; see also Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Custom-
ary International Law in the United States, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450, 455, 456 & n.18, 480
(1989); Trimble, supra note 7, at 673, 678, 707, 716-17, 721, 727-30; but see United States v.
Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1233, 1237 (C.C.D. N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342a) (argument of counsel)("[T]he
law of nations... is perpetual, and does not require to have its meaning declared every second
year."); Heathfield v. Chilton, 4 Burrow 2015, 2016 (K.B. 1767) (Lord Mansfield affirming just
before our Revolution that the law of nations is a part of the common law of England and cannot
be altered by an act of Parliament.); text accompanying notes and sources cited infra notes 32,
38, 44-48, 50, 53-57.
Domestic elites and those who serve them may also attempt to limit the role of customary law
because it can be seemingly less certain and manageable than written law and, as law "from the
bottom up," it is potentially threatening to specially favored value positions. Cf. J. BRIERLY,
supra note 4, at 62. See also Reisman, supra note 9, at 106. Efforts to wrest from elites related
monopolizations of authority and control have early judicial benchmarks. See, e.g., Dr. Bon-
ham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610) (Coke, C.J.) (The common law will control an incon-
sistent statute.); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); Paust, supra note 1, at 440-41 n.91. For a
contrary viewpoint, see Maier, supra at 475 (assumption that "common law decision-making is
legitimate... only when there is no legislation... and must give way... after the legislature
speaks").
11. See, supra notes 2-4, 6; L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 363. See also infra note 14.
12. See L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 364; Paust, The Concept of Norm: Toward a Better Under-
standing of Content, Authority, and Choice, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 226, 244-45 (1980); Kirgis, Custom
on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 146, 149 (1987). Professor Kirgis has stressed the follow-
ing factors or qualities: "clearly demonstrated opinio juris," "morally distasteful," "widely ac-
cepted human values," and has also stated that "a clearly demonstrated opiniojuris establishes a
customary rule without much (or any) affirmative showing that governments are consistently
behaving in accordance with the asserted rule." See also L. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 7, at 236-
37; Raman, supra note 7, at 382 (adding frequency, intensity, duration, repetition, geographic
range as factors to be considered as well as other features of context); H. THIRLWAY, INTERNA-
TIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 66, 70 (1972); K. WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRES-
ENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 36, 68, 155-56 (1964) (because of better communications, fewer
precedents are now necessary and the objectivation of the will of the parties is the actual criterion
Fall 1990]
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provides a more realistic approach to the identification and clarifica-
tion of normative content and should aid those who must apply cus-
tomary international law in making informed and rational choices. It
would also be useful to know how long such patterns of expectation
have existed, although a prior stability evident through time is no
guarantee of continued acceptance in the future and time is not other-
wise a determinative factor.13 It is possible, of course, to have a rela-
tively recently widespread and intensely held expectation that
something is legally appropriate or required and that such a pattern of
opiniojuris could form one of the components of a new rule of custom-
ary international law, one that will even be more stable in the future.
It is also significant that the behavioral element of custom (i.e.,
general practice), is similarly free from the need for total conformity,
and it rests not merely upon the practice of States as such but ulti-
mately upon the practice of all participants in the international legal
process. Thus, a particular nation-state might disagree whether a par-
ticular norm is customary and might even violate such a norm, but it
would still be bound if the norm is supported by patterns of generally
shared legal expectation and conforming behavior extant in the com-
munity.14 If the patterns of violation become too widespread, how-
ever, one of the primary bases of customary law can be lost. Similarly,
for establishment of international customary law); Meron, supra note 4, at 354-62, 367-69;
Zamora, Is There Customary International Economic Law? 32 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 20
(1989); cf. Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECUEIL
DES COURS 1, 26 ([1978 11 1979).
13. See also L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 363-64; Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 12, at 25-26;
Raman, supra note 7, at 368, 387-88, 390; Wright, Remarks, 64 (No. 4) AM. J. INT'L L. 52
(1970); cf. D'Amato, supra note 7, at 102 (State acts and "accommodations" of "state interests"
are "authoritative... because they manifest... latent stability.").
14. A contrary view, one followed by what seems to be a minority of textwriters, advances
the illogical proposition that a dissenting State should be "exempt" from a new rule of customary
law (as opposed to prior rules still extant, and whether or not the State is newly created). See,
e.g., T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER, supra note 7, at 24; L. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 7, at 227,
239-40; Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International
Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 2, 5, 16, 21-22 (1985) (considering mostly of British and Soviet
writers of a positivist bent); Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 957 (1986); Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985); Tunkin, Co-Existence and Inter-
national Law, 95 RECUEIL DES COURs 3, 13 ([1958 III] 1959); RESTATEMENT, supra note 7,
§ 102, Comments b & d ("[Iun principle a state that indicates its dissent from a practice while the
law is still in the process of development is not bound by that rule even after it matures,"
although "[h]istorically, such .. .exemption . . .has been rare."), Reporters' Note 2 (same); see
also Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting
the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CINN. L. REV. 655, 683 (1983); Maier, supra note 10,
at 455, 470-71, 480; but see RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 102, Comment k and Reporters'
Note 6 (no such exemption from peremptory norms); L. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 7, at 240-42,
283, 285, 289-92 (same); Raman, supra note 7, at 384-86, 388, 391, 399 n.9; H. THIRLWAY, supra
note 12, at 110; Charney, supra at 5 ("support ... in State practice and judicial decisions is
limited"), 9-22, 24; Kelly, supra note 7, at 152 (professorial preference for "persistent objector
[Vol. 12:59
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if it is no longer generally expected that a norm is legally appropriate
concept has little support in state practice"); Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 823, 830-31 (1988); Steinhardt, supra note 10, at 1164.
Such a viewpoint is also inconsistent with predominant trends in U.S. opinions and is theoret-
ically unsound since customary international law rests upon general assent (not unanimous con-
sent) and, as the U.S. Supreme Court has declared emphatically, "that law is of universal
obligation." The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187 (1871). See also The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 711 ((1900) quoting The Scotia; United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 ("law of
nations requires every national government"), 487 (noting re: a "right given by the law of na-
tions,... what is law for one is, under the same circumstances, law for the other" and a "right
secured by the law of nations ... is one the United States ... are bound to protect.") (1887));
Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216, 236 (1872) ("rule is universal and peremptory... by
the law of nations"); Cliquot's Champagne, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 114, 139 (1866) (argument of coun-
sel, quoting 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 32 (1826): "law of nations enjoins
upon every nation .... ); Jecker, Torre & Co. v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112
(1855) ("the law of nations - forming a part, too, of the municipal jurisprudence of every coun-
try"); Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 419 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concur-
ring) ("universally received principles of the law of nations"); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
66, 99 & n.c (argument of counsel that "no particular nation can increase or diminish the list of
offenses punishable by the law of nations"); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161
(1820) ("the universal law of society"); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 277 (1808) (Mar-
shall, C.J.) ("the law of nations is the law of all tribunals in the society of nations" (quoted in Ex
parte Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 491 (1892) (argument of counsel))); id. at 267 (argument of counsel:'
"This doctrine is acknowledged by all nations of Europe, except England. But England cannot
make the law of nations."); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227 (1796) (Chase, C.J.) (noting
that "general" law of nations is "universal ... and binds all nations" but also stating that "cus-
tomary ... only binds all nations that have assented to it"); Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
160, 162 (1792) ("the great universal law" must not be altered); James v. Allen, I U.S. (1 Dall.)
188, 190 (1786) (argument of counsel: "the law of nations, which is common to all the world");
The Hellig Olav, 282 F. 534, 543 (2d Cir. 1922) (quoting Cheriot v. Foussat, 3 Binn. 220, 256
(Pa. 1810) (Tilghman, C.J.) ("The United States have always considered themselves bound by
the law of nations .... ); Martin v. United States, 278 F. 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1922) (quoting Smith,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat) at 161); Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 F. 181, 182 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892) ("univer-
sally acknowledged," (quoting Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 50 (1852))); In re
Long Island N. Shore Passenger & Freight Transp. Co., 5 F. 599, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1881) (quoting
The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170); United States v. Williamson, 28 F. Cas. 686, 692 (E.D. Pa.
1855) (No. 16,726) ("because of its universal obligation, is called the 'law of nations.' "); United
States v. One Hundred Barrels of Cement, 27 F. Cas. 292, 298 (E.D. Mo. 1862) (No. 15,945)
("universal"); La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551); United
States v. The F.W. Johnson, 25 F. Cas. 1232, 1232 (D. Md. 1861) (No. 15,179) ("law of nations
... that universal law..."); United States v. Darnaud, 25 F. Cas. 754, 760 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1855)
(No. 14,918) ("universal"); The Scotia, 21 F. Cas. 783, 795-96 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1870) (No.
12,513) ("[Ilt would seem to follow, that the vessels of all nations are now bound to observe them
[i.e., new customary norms], whether their own particular government has approved them or
not; for, if the general consent of nations, however expressed, is effectual to establish interna-
tional law, the failure of a particular nation to express its consent does not destroy the rule.");
Poland v. The Spartan, 19 F. Cas. 912, 916 n.2 (D.C.D. Me.) (No. 11,246) ("universal"); Hol-
lingsworth v. The Betsey, 12 F. Cas. 348, 351 (D. Pa. 1795) (No. 6,612) ("No one nation has...
the right to dictate in this or any other particular ... what shall be the law of nations .... );
Henfield's Case, I I F. Cas. 1099, 1102, 1107 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (adding: "On states
as well as individuals the duties of humanity are strictly incumbent .... " (emphasis added));
Dole v. New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 7 F. Cas. 837, 847 (C.C.D. Mass. 1864) (No. 3,966)
(citing speech of Chief Justice Marshall in the United States House of Representatives, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) app. 8, "No particular nation can increase or diminish the list of offences."); The Chap-
man, 5 F. Cas. 471, 474 (N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 2,602) (quoting "the celebrated argument by Mr.
(afterward Chief Justice) Marshall, in United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 860, 862 (D.S.C.
1799) (No. 16,175): " 'piracy, under the law of nations, . . . punishable by all nations . . . No
particular nation can increase or diminish the list of offenses thus punishable"); Finzer v. Barry,
798 F.2d 1450, 1456-58 (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'd in part and aff'd in part sub nom., Boos
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or required, the other base of customary law can be lost. When either
v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299-300 (1865); 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 362-
63 (1859); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 570-71 (1822) ("in common with other nations ... strict
observance"); I Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 511-12 (1821) ("[The law of nations] presents an entire
system..." and "every part of it is equally obligatory on all nations .... [I]f a nation may take it
upon herself . . . to modify, enlarge, restrain, and alter it at pleasure, to suit her interest or
convenience, without the consent and against the interest of other nations, ...that equality,
which is the basis of this law, is gone, and it becomes the peculiar law of the nation which
possesses this self-dispensing power; or, in other words, the law of the strongest ...."); I Op.
Att'y Gen. 61, 62 (1796); Iredell, Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of South Carolina
(May 12, 1794), in GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (1794) ("The Law of Nations, by which
alone all controversies between nation and nation can be determined") (emphasis added); Wil-
son, Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Virginia (May 23, 1791), in 2 THE WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 813-14 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967) ("voluntary" law of nations related to treaties
and can be altered, but "no state or states can.., alter or abrogate the law of nations any further
... [t]his they can no more do, than a citizen can, . . . or two citizens can .... alter or abrogate
the laws of the community, in which they reside."); 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 502 (J. Elliot ed. 1836)
(statement of G. Nicholas) ("law of nations" is "permanent" and "superior to any act or law of
any nation; it implied the consent of all, and was mutually binding on all"); H. GROTIUS, supra
note 5, at bk. I, ch. III, pt. XVI; I J. KENT, supra, at 3 ("The law of nations... is equally binding
... upon all mankind."); E. VATFEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS lviii (1758) ("as this law is immuta-
ble and the obligations that arise from it necessary and indispensable, nations can neither make
any changes in it by their conventions, dispense with it in their own conduct, nor reciprocally
release each other from the observance of it"); Gasser, Remarks, 81 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
32 (1987); Humphrey, The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation, 17 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 527, 529 (1976); Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
VAND. L. REV. 819, 827-28 (1989); Paust, supra note 1, at 419-21 & n.55, 440 n.91; cf The
Peterhoff v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 28, 57 (1866) ("[W]e administer the public law of
nations, and are not at liberty to inquire what is for the particular advantage or disadvantage of
our own or another country. We must follow the lights of reason and the lessons of the masters
of international jurisprudence."); The Star, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 78, 99-100 n.1 (1818) (English
cases, which should be compared with Heathfield v. Chilton, 4 Burrow 2015 (K.B. 1767); Fitz-
simmons v. The Newport Ins. Co., 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 185, 188 (1808) (argument of counsel that
"[u]pon a question of general law, or the law of nations, we are not to look to the practice of one
nation only"); Jay, Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of New York NEW HAMPSHIRE
GAZETTE, Apr. 4, 1790 ("part of the laws of this, and every other civilized nation") (emphasis
added); but see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 58 n.8 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Farrell v.
United States, 336 U.S. 511, 517 (1949) (use of the use of maritime rules is "in a peculiar sense an
international law, but application of its specific rules depends upon acceptance by the United
States") (quoted in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (another maritime law case)).
It is not unimportant that the Continental Congress resolved in 1779 that "the law of nations
[must].. .be most strictly observed." 14 J. CONT. CONG. 635 (W. Ford ed. 1909).
As a Japanese court rightly noted, customary rules and obligations, "by their very nature,
must have equal force for all the members of the international community, and cannot therefore
be the subject of any right of unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any one of them in its own
favor." Judgment of Apr. 22, 1982, Chisai (District Court), Tokyo, 27 JAPANESE ANN. OF INT'L
L. 148, 167 (1984). See also L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 363 ("the function of customary interna-
tional law is precisely to vitiate the requirement of specific consent as the basis of international
obligation .... [It] permits 'sovereign' states - new as well as old - to be subject to interna-
tional law without specific consent."); A. D'AMATO, supra note 7, at 165, 187-95, 199, 234, 236,
246, 261; R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
171 (1964); K. Raman, supra note 7, at 384-86, 388, 391, 399 n.9; Charney, supra note 14, at 5
(arguments against "the consensual theory of international law ... might ... also require rejec-
tion of the persistent objector rule"), 15-22, 24; Higgins, The United Nations and Lawmaking.:
The Political Organs, 64 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 37, 43, 58 (1970); Jimenez de Arechaga,
supra note 12, at 28-30 (cf. id. at 30); McDougal, Remarks, 73 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 332
(1979) [hereinafter Remarks (II)]; McDougal, Remarks, 64 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 56, 57
(1970) [hereinafter Remarks (I) ]; Reisman, supra note 9, at I I l ("norms are prescribed because
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base is no longer generally extant, there can be no conjoining of gen-
eral patterns of legal expectation and behavior and, for such a social
moment at least, a prior customary law will no longer be operative.
Since each nation-state, indeed each human being, is a participant
in both the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of dynamic customary
international law, each may initiate a change in such law or, with
others, reaffirm its validity. Indeed, such a law at least, born of what
people think and do, is constantly reviewed and "re-enacted" in the
social process, changed, or terminated. In the long-term, one wants to
view such law with a movie camera; and yet at any given social mo-
ment (or at the time of a particular decision or activity), the existence
of a customary international law will be dependent upon relevant pat-
terns of expectation and behavior then extant. 15
they are policies which part of the community does not voluntarily or spontaneously support"); 2
THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 814 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967) (quoting Justice Wilson's 1791
charge to a grand jury that the customary law of nations is not "voluntary"). But see Jackson v.
People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1494 (11 th Cir. 1986) (claim of China that a develop-
ing customary rule of international law is not binding on states that do not agree with it); Maier,
supra note 10, at 455, 456 & n.18. For an attack on the now more widely discredited consent
theory from a neo-naturalist perspective, see Teson, International Obligation and the Theory of
Hypothetical Consent, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 84, 85, 94-107 (1990).
15. See also Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Government to
Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913, 914-15 n.7 (1986) (while change in
opiniojuris "may contribute substantially to the development of customary law, I doubt that...
[such] can effect a change in the absence of state practice"-[yet, precisely because there must be
a conjoining of patterns of expectation and practice for the creation and/or continuation of a
norm, the lack of one of the elements, e.g., opiniojuris, can lead to the demise of a customary
norm. See also Reisman, supra note 9, at 108, 119.]); Kirgis, supra note 12, at 149-50. For this
reason, even those who later aid in the change or termination of a customary norm (who could be
any sort of participant) might be subject to civil or criminal sanctions for a particular violation -
creators all, but individually bound while a given norm is extant. See also note 14 supra; Chris-
tenson, The World Court and Jus Cogens, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, 96 (1987); Paust, The President
Is Bound By International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377, 388-89 & n.73 (1987); Franck, Remarks,
80 Proc., Am. Soc. Int'l L. 307 (1986); Charney, Remarks, id. at 308; but see Maier, supra note
10, at 470-71, 480; Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV.
1205, 1254-56 & n.211 (1988) (also arguing unrealistically that only States participate in the
formation of customary international norms - see id. at 1253-55). Clearly also any new State
and any State that has not had an opportunity to act in accordance with a customary norm, or to
refrain from acting, and has not yet expressed its view is bound by extant law (and consent is not
determinative-see note 14, supra), although members of the new entity (as any other) continue
to participate in processes of norm formation, continuation, and termination (through their ac-
tions and inactions-see text at note 9, supra, and notes 30-31, infra). Cf Mullerson, Sources of
International Law: New Tendencies in Soviet Thinking, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 504 (1989).
For Professor Maier, if a State "acts contrary to... a preexisting rule," say the prohibition of
genocide, "[t]he only time when it can accurately be said that a state violates international law is
when [it so acts]... and continues to act in the face of legal protests from other community
members.. . because the protests reaffirm that the state acts contrary to... legitimate expecta-
tions .... Id. at 470-71. See also Weisburd, supra at 1207, 1254-56 (assuming simplistically
that violations of law are merely "votes" to change the law and that courts and others have no
power to participate in the formation, continuation, or termination of a customary norm, arguing
also that "voters" or those who represent them are not legally bound or accountable); cf Trim-
ble, supra note 7, at 711; but see Charney, supra note 15, at 915 ("[u]ntil... new [legal] regime...
[actor] was in violation"), 916 ("the actor is in violation"), 917 ("[s]uch a violation does not
immunize the state from treatment as a violator .. "); Glennon, Can the President Do No
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These recognitions are also critical for the researcher's task. In
one sense, they simplify that task since one need only identify patterns
of what real people generally think and do. Yet, in another sense, re-
searching customary law is significantly complicated by the fact that
each person ultimately is a participant in the shaping of customary law
and thus each viewpoint and every sort of human interaction could be
relevant.' 6 But relevance is also a delimiting criterion. Which pat-
terns of expectation and which patterns of action and inaction are, to
be investigated will depend in part on choice about relevance. And
there are additional limitations and even acceptable substitutes for full
inquiry..
For example, it is often impossible for one researcher to identify
every relevant pattern of expectation and behavior. However, far less
than perfect investigation has been accepted by courts and others,
especially if documentation of such patterns is with reference to "judi-
cial decisions,... the works of jurists and commentators, and [docu-
mented]. . . acts and usages of . . .nations."' 7 Any evidence of
Wrong?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 923, 928 (1986) ("and thus represent violations"); Hartman, supra
note 14, at 683; Rowles, supra note 7, at 317; Schachter, Remarks, 81 Proc., Am. Soc. Int'lL. 164
(1987). Under such a theoretical viewpoint, which is counterposed literally to "common sense"
(see text at note 3, supra) and common right and reason, initial acts of genocide must be permit-
ted if they are quick (with no "and continues to act") or, if they continue, are not met by "legal
protests" (presumably while the acts of genocide are occurring and not thereafter) - even if
most others refrain from committing acts of genocide and general patterns of expectation (per-
haps even including those within the violator's nation) were and continue to be that genocide is
an international crime.
16. See also L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 362, 364; M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN,
supra note 4, at 73-74, 88-89, 96-107, 161-79, 413; McDOUGAL, supra note 14, at 328, adding:
"norms did not simply exist; they were manifested in a continuous process of evolution and
hence emanated from several different sources... No one of these sources of law carried ultimate
or exclusive importance; in each case, particular inferences might be drawn about expectations,
but in the greatest likelihood, they would come from several diverse sources."; McDoUGAL,
supra note 9, at 199; Reisman, supra note 9, at 104-07, 120. Similarly, theoretical questions of
which comes first (opinio or behavior) or which mirrors the other (opinio or practice) are less
than useful and/or "chicken or egg." See also note 15, supra; notes 30-31, infra.
17. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). See alsoExparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1,
30-31, 35 (1942); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 378-79, 383 (1934); United States v.
Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1933); Vilas v. City of Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 357-58 (1911); Dooley
v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 231 (1901); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170,
187-88 (1871); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-62, 163-81 n.a; The Star, 16
U.S. (3 Wheat.) 78, 86, 99-100 (1818); The Commercen, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 382, 387-91 & nn.f-l
(1816); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 425-26, 429, 433-34, 437-42, 449-53 (1815); Thirty
Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815); The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
253, 278-80, 282-83, 289-92 (1814); The Julia, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 181, 193-96, 198-201 (C.C.D.
Mass. (1813) 1814); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 226-27 (1796); Respublica v. De
Longchamps, I U.S. (1 DalI.) 111, 113, 116 (1784); In re Doe v. United States, 860 F.2d 40, 45
(2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1988); Amerada Hess Ship-
ping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 423-26, 428 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds., 109 S.Ct. 683 (1989); West v. Multibanco Comerex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 831-32 (9th
Cir. 1987); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1455-58 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Mendaro v. World Bank,
717 F.2d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Yiu Sing Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 876 nn.22 & 24 (2d
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customary norms and relevant patterns of expectation or behavior can
Cir. 1983); Cruz v. Zapata Ocean Resources, Inc., 695 F.2d 428, 433-34 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380-83 (11th Cir. 1982); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 888-92 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 462 U.S. 611 (1982); Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980); Netherlands v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 201 F.2d 455, 461-63 (2d Cir. 1953); Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604, 607-11 (9th Cir.
1951); The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 732-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); The Olinde Rodrigues, 91 F. 274,
277-82 (D.S.C. 1898); United States v. The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 412-42, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y.
1885); United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 656 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 15,494); Henfield's
Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1102-04, 1107-08, 1117-20 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360); The Fame, 8 F.
Cas. 984 (C.C.D. Me. 1822) (No. 4,634); The Emulous, 8 F. Cas. 697, 698-703 (C.C.D. Mass.
1813) (No. 4,479); The Chapman, 5 F. Cas. 471, 474-76 (N.D. Ca. 1864) (No. 2,602); United
States v. Buck, 690 F.Supp. 1291, 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F.Supp.
246, 255-56, 259, 261 (D.D.C. 1985); Cranston v. Reagan, 611 F.Supp. 247, 253 (D.D.C. 1985);
Lareau v. Manson, 507 F.Supp. 1177, 1188 n.9, 1193 n.18 (D. Conn. 1980); United States v.
Enger, 472 F.Supp. 490, 504-05 (D.N.J. 1978); United States v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F.Supp. 425, 428
& n.6, 440 & nn.49-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857, 864-65 (D. Md. 1961);
United States v. Melekh, 190 F.Supp. 67, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Rodriguez, 182
F.Supp. 479, 487-88 (S.D. Cal. 1960); In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946); Arcaya v.
Paez, 145 F.Supp. 464, 470-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F.Supp. 602, 608-25
(D. Utah 1951); Tomasicchio v. Acheson, 98 F.Supp. 166, 168-69 (D.D.C. 1951); Bergman v. De
Sieyes, 71 F.Supp. 334, 335-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509 (1821); 1 Op. Att'y Gen.
406, 408-13 (1820); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 87, 88 (1799); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 32, 34-38 (1793); Triquet v.
Bath, 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 938 (1764)("the authority of writers"); Stat., I.C.J., art.
38(1)(d)("judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the vari-
ous nations"); RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 103(2); 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERI-
CAN LAW 18-19, passim (1826). In a realistic sense, these have been among the primary
participants in the formation, continuation and termination of customary norms, participating
also in the review, invocation and application of norms by others. On the lack of an apparent
need for "a methodical, social-scientific gathering of evidence," see Zamora, supra note 12, at 21,
who nonetheless seems to decry the "lack of hard decisional law... [and] the quality of analy-
sis .... . Id. at 37-39; but see id. at 25. Apparently no longer utilized directly are "the great
principles of reason and justice" recognized by Chief Justice Marshall as being useful factors, at
least when they are "fixed and rendered stable by a series of judicial decisions." Thirty Hogs-
heads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815). See also United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 713 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) ("natural reason and justice"); The
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
464, 494 (1823) (general doctrine of "elementary writers" not determinative when against "every
principle of just interpretation" and would "supersede all reasoning"); The Venus, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 253, 297 (1814) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting: "The law of nations is a law founded on the
great and immutable principles of equity and natural justice."); United States v. The La Jeune
Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (D.Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) ("may be deduced... from the general
principles of right and justice"; "correct reasoning" and "moral obligation ... unless it be relaxed
or waived by the consent of nations, which may be evidenced by their general practice"; yet "no
practice whatsoever can obliterate the fundamental distinction between right and wrong," "cor-
rect principle," "injustice," "general principles of justice and humanity"); Bergman v. De Sieyes,
71 F.Supp. 334, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (quoting Holbrook, Nelson & Co. v. Henderson, 6 N.Y.
Super. Ct. 619, 32 (1839) ("law of nations... must be brought to the test of enlightened reason
and of liberal principles .. ")); 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 358 (1859) ("natural reason and justice"));
I Op. Att'y Gen. 30, 32 (1793) ("British reasoning... [that the] 'laws of nations [are] founded
upon justice, equity, convenience, and the reason of the thing, and confirmed by long us-
age'...."); J. BRIERLY, supra note 4, at 66-69; JAY, supra note 14, at 823 & nn.12-13; cf. Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 604 F.Supp. 280, 290 (D.D.C. 1984) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 18(b)(iv)
(1965)); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557 n.6 (5th Cir. 1962) (quoting Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 860 (2d Cir. 1962) ("subject to generally accepted principles
of morality whether most men live by these principles or not")), cert. denied sub nom. Jimenez v.
Hixon, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); Bassiouni, A Fundamental Approach to "General Principles of Inter-
national Law," 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 768, 785 (1990); Hartman, supra note 14, at 678-79; Kirgis,
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be useful.' 8 In fact, in addition to judicial opinions and the works
of textwriters U.S. courts have considered treaties and other inter-
national agreements;19 domestic constitutions or legislation;20
supra note 12 at 149; Meron, supra note 4, at 357 n.31, 361 (tribunals "guided.. .by the degree of
offensiveness of certain acts to human dignity"), 368-69; Schachter, International Law in Theory
and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 11, 118 ([1982 V] 1985); Note, Human Rights and Capi-
tal Punishment: The Case of South Africa, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 273, 277-79 (1989). The Second
Circuit in Banco Nacional knew, however, that morality as such had been rejected as a standard
in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 114-19, 121 (1825). See Banco Nacional, 307 F.2d 845,
860 (1981). See also Peters v. Warren Insurance Co., 19 F. Cas. 373, 376 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838)
(No. 11,035) ("grows out of the arbitrary provision in the law of nations...not as dictated by
natural justice, nor possibly as consistent with it .. ") (quoted in The Max Morris, 28 F. 881,
883 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1886)). Perhaps of a related interest however, especially to empirical natural-
ists, it is evident that customary international law helps to clarify the contemporary core and
continuity of the soul of humanity. On earthly morality, see also Bassiouni, supra; Paust, The
Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related Forms of Social Violence. Testing
the Limits of Permissibility, 32 EMORY L.J. 545, 563-64 n.74, 581 (1983).
18. See also L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 362, 364; McDougal, Remarks, supra note 9, at 199;
Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804,
830-37, 840 (1983); Raman, supra note 7, at 390, 398; Reisman, supra note 9, at 104-07;
Schechter, Towards A World Rule of Law-Customary International Law in American Courts, 29
FORDHAM L. REV. 313, 327-47, 352-54 (1960); Zamora, supra note 12, at 38; supra note 16. But
see Maier, supra note 10, at 471 (current "community opinion.., can be inferred only from the
contemporaneous interaction of community members") (emphasis added), 476 ("courts find in-
ternational legal principles by examining the practice of states").
19. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8, 11-16 (1946); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30 &
n.7, 34-36, 38 (1942); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 687-91, 698-99, 707 (1900); The
Peterhoff, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 28, 50 (1866); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
830 F.2d 421, 424 (2d Cir. 1987); Arcoren v. Peters, 811 F.2d 392, 397 n.l (8th Cir. 1987);
Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 799-
800 n.21 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); United States v. Pena-Jessie, 763 F.2d 618,
620-21 (4th Cir. 1985); Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Government of
Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 425-27 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370,
375 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 258 (1st Cir. 1982); United States
v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380, 1382 (11th Cir. 1982); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkin-
son, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1981); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 n.7, 881-84 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063,
1090 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 308 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1979); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1267 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); Muraka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1954);
Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d 455, 461-63 (2d Cir. 1953); Bergman v. De
Sieyes, 170 F.2d 334, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); United States v. The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 438,
440 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551);
United States v. Buck, 690 F.Supp. 1291, 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("slight acceptance" may evi-
dence lack of generally shared expectation); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1542
(N.D. Cal. 1987), on reh'g, 694 F.Supp. 707, 710 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623
F.Supp. 246, 256, 259, 261 (D.D.C. 1985); Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F.Supp. 1049, 1061
n.18 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F.Supp. 1177, 1188 n.9, 1193 n.18 (D. Conn.
1980); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F.Supp. 787, 795-97 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Rodri-
guez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Enger, 472
F.Supp. 490, 505-06 (D.N.J. 1978); C.A.B. v. Island Airlines, Inc., 235 F.Supp. 990, 993-94 n.6
(D. Haw. 1964); Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F.Supp. 602, 609-10, 614 (D. Utah 1951); Bergman v.
De Sieyes, 71 F.Supp. 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 516, 520-21 (1821); 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 406, 411-12 (1820); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 87, 89 (1799); Republic of Argentina v. City of
New York, 25 N.Y. 2d 252, 250 N.E.2d 698, 701 (1969). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 7,
§ 102, Comments f and i, Reporters' Notes 2, 4 (treaties may change or reflect changed opinio
juris), 5 (international agreements may "codify" and "help create" customary international law);
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executive orders, declarations or recognitions; 21 draft conventions
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090) at 9-13 (adding: "uniform treaty consideration... provides a strong
indication that the proscription... has entered customary international law.") (reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 585, 591-96 & nn.9-13 (1980); A. D'AMATO, supra note 7, at 104, 106, 128 ("[N]ational
and international courts have realized that treaties, far from being irrelevant to the content of
international law, in fact are the records of state acts and commitments that continually shape,
change, and refine the content of customary law."); L. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 7, at 232-33; 1
J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF- INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1906); Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129
RECUEIL DES COURS 25 ([1970 I] 1971); Bilder, Remarks, 81 PROC., AM. Soc. INT'L L. 157
(1987); Charney, Remarks, id. at 160; Mendelson, Remarks, id. at 161-63; Czaplinski, Sources of
International Law in the Nicaragua Case, 38 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 151 (1989); D'Amato, Mani-
fest Intent and the Generation by Treaty of Customary Rules of International Law, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 892 (1970); Treaties as a Source of General Rules of International Law, 3 HARV. INT'L
L. CLUB BULL. 1 (1962); An Alternative to the Law of the Sea Convention, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
281, 281-82 (1983); Gamble & Frankowska, The 1982 Convention and Customary Law of the Sea:
Observations, a Framework, and a Warning, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491, 492, 494-96ff (1984);
Gasser, supra note 14, at 33; Hartman, supra note 14, at 671-73; Jimenez de Arechaga, supra
note 12, at 11-30 (demonstrating also the potentially rich source of opinio juris among official
elite communications; Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human Rights
Law, 3 HARV. H.R.J. 53, 70 (1990); Meron, supra note 4, at 353, 367,passim; Raman, supra note
7, at 392-93; Schechter, supra note 18, at 327-40; Stein, supra note 14, at 464-66; Strossen, Recent
U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process
Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HAST. L.J. 805, 816-18 (1990); Zamora, supra note 12, at 19-
20; The Steamship Appam, 243 U.S. 124, 134 (1917) (argument that the 1907 Hague Convention
is "declaratory of the existing law of nations"); Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523,
527-28 (1927); Olivera v. Union Insurance Co., 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 183, 197 n.a (1818); The
Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 283 (1814); Maryland Insurance Co. v. Woods, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 29, 39 (1810) (argument that the "British treaty is not in force, but it is a correct exposi-
tion of the law of nations on the subject"); Fitzsimmons v. The Newport Insurance Co., 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 185, 199 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.) (same); United States v. Quemener, 789 F.2d 145, 153
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986); United States v. County of Arlington, Va., 702
F.2d 485, 487-88 (4th Cir. 1983); The Appam, 234 F. 389, 397 (E.D. Va. 1916) (Hague Conven-
tion of 1907 is "declaratory of the existing law of nations"); United States v. Alaska, 236 F.Supp.
388, 394 (D. Alaska 1964), rev'd, 353 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1965); Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 3, 74-75 [hereinafter Namibia Opinion]; but
see Trimble, supra note 7, at 681 (use of treaties improper according to the author).
20. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 689, 691, 700-01, 711 (1900); The Scotia, 81
U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1871); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 338, 453 (1815); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 n.10, 884, 885 n.17 (2d Cir. 1980); The Kaiser Wilhelm II, 230 F.
717, 722-23 (D.N.J. 1916), rev'd, 246 F. 786 (C.C.A.N.J. 1917); La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas.
832, 849-50 (D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F.Supp. 707, 710 (N.D.
Col. 1987); Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F.Supp. 246, 259, 261-62 (D.D.C. 1985); United States
v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F.Supp. 425, 433 & n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Arcaya v. Paez, 145 F.Supp. 464,
471 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 515 (1821) ("instances are drawn from the civil
law"); I J. KENT, supra note 17, at 18-19; 1 J. MOORE, supra note 19, at 2, 4. See also RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 7, § 102, Reporters' Note 7 (principle common to major legal systems of the
world); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1456-57 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. The Ambrose
Light, 25 F. 408, 440-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F.Supp. 1177, 1193 (D. Conn.
1980).
21. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 37 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Exparte Qui-
rin, 317 U.S. 1, 31-37 (1942); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 156 & n.9 (1933); The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 687-90, 692-700 (1900); United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249,
264-65 (1893); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 443, 453 (1815); West v. Multibanco
Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 1987); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1458 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); United States v. Quemener, 789 F.2d 145, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
County of Arlington, Va., 702 F.2d 485, 487-88 (4th Cir. 1985); Cruz v. Zapata Ocean Re-
sources, Inc., 695 F.2d 428, 434 (9th Cir. 1982); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan
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or codes;2 2 reports, resolutions or decisions of international organiza-
tions;23 and even the testimony or affidavits of textwriters.
24
Since any such evidence of expectation and behavior can be useful,
Bank, 658 F.2d 845, 888-90 (2d Cir. 1962); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir.
1980); Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270, 273-74 (3d Cir. 1980); Flota Maritima
Browning de Cuba, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 624 n.10 (4th Cir.
1964); Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1984); Cobb v. United States, 191
F.2d 604, 607 n.10, 608 nn.12, 15-17, 609 nn.21-23, 610 nn.24, 26, 611 n.28 (9th Cir. 1951); The
Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 733-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); The Kaiser Wilhelm II, 230 F. 717, 722-23
(D.N.J. 1916), rev'd, 246 F. 786 (C.C.A. N.J. 1917); The Olinde Rodrigues, 91 F. 274, 279-80,
282 (D.S.C. 1898); United States v. The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 420, 438-40, 443-46
(S.D.N.Y. 1885); United States v. Buck, 690 F.Supp. 1291, 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 505 F.Supp. at 797-98; United States v. Enger, 472 F.Supp. 490, 504 (D.N.J. 1978);
United States v. Alaska, 236 F.Supp. 388, 392-95 (D. Alaska 1964), rev'd, 353 F.2d 210 (9th Cir.
1965); C.A.B. v. Island Airlines, Inc., 235 F.Supp. 990, 1002-04 & n.18, 1006 (D. Haw. 1964);
Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F.Supp. 602, 610 (D. Utah 1951); United States v. Coplon, 88 F.Supp.
915, 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F.Supp. 334, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 509, 517 (1821); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 87, 90-91 (1799); 1 J. KENT, supra note 17, at 19.
See also United States v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F.Supp. 425, 429-30 n.ll (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Schechter,
supra note 18, at 345-47.
22. See, e.g., Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 800 n.22 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986) (Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind); United States v.
Birch, 470 F.2d 808, 811 n.4 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973) (1935 Harvard
Research Project used relating to customary norms concerning jurisdiction to prescribe); United
States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968) (same); Victory
Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 359 n.8
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (1931 Draft Convention of Harvard Research
Project); Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 362-63 (2d Cir. 1948) (1935 Harvard Research
Project); Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691, 693 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S.
640 (1939) (same); United States v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 896, 900 (D.D.C. 1988) (same); United
States v. Rodriguez, 182 F.Supp. 479, 487-90 & n.9 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd in part rev'd in part
sub nom., Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961);
Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F.Supp. 334, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir.
1948); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 102, Reporters' Note 2 (international conferences
'codifying customary law"), § 103, Reporters' Note I ("draft texts"), § 701, Reporters' Note 7;
The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (textwriter "referring to proceedings of Institute
of International Law at Turin in 1882"). At the international level, see Case Concerning the
Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 38 (draft convention can be binding if "it
embodies or crystallizes a pre-existing or emergent rule of customary international law");
Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 12, at 14-21; Zamora, supra note 12, at 20 & n.53, 21 & n.59.
23. See, e.g., First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Commercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 628-29 n.20 (1983); United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89 (1986); United States v. Louisiana,
394 U.S. 11, 42-44, 69-74, passim (1969); United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 172 (1965);
United States v. Clotida, 892 F.2d 1098, 1105-06 (1st Cir. 1989); Lipscomb, By and Through
DeFehr v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242, 1244 n.l (9th Cir. 1989); M.A. v. I.N.S., 858 F.2d 210, 219
n.7 (4th Cir. 1988); Arcoren v. Peters, 811 F.2d 392, 397 n.l (8th Cir. 1987); Cerrillo-Perez v.
I.N.S., 809 F.2d 1419, 1423 (9th Cir. 1987); Cruz v. Zapata Ocean Resources, Inc., 695 F.2d 428,
433 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 888-91 (2d Cir. 1981) (also
recognizing lack of full, precise "consensus"); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d
1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 365 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Reavley, J., dissenting); F.T.C. v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300,
1313 n.67, 1316 n.85 (D.C. Cir. 1980), vacated, 63 F.2d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1980); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-83, 884 n.16 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267,
277-78 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Alaska, 497 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1974); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F.Supp.
707, 710-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F.Supp. 1177, 1188 n.9, 1193 n.18 (D.
Conn. 1980); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F.Supp. 787, 795-97 (D. Kansas 1980); American
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it is also partly misleading to ask whether a United Nations General
Assembly resolution can be a source of customary law. A more realis-
tic question, for example, might be whether a nearly unanimous reso-
lution concerning the content or application of a norm of international
law evidences a pattern of generally shared legal expectation or opinio
juris.25 The very act of voting on a resolution is in some sense also an
Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F.Supp. 522, 524 & n.l (D.D.C. 1980); Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 477 F.Supp.
553, 567 (C.D. Cal. 1979); United States v. Enger, 472 F.Supp. 490, 505 (D.N.J. 1978); United
States v. Alaska, 352 F.Supp. 815, 817-18 (15. Alaska 1972); United States v. Alaska, 236 F.Supp.
388, 392-93 (D. Alaska 1964); C.A.B. v. Island Airlines, Inc., 235 F.Supp. 990, 1004-05 & nn.20,
22-23, 25-28 (D. Hawaii 1964); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F.Supp. 479, 489-90 (S.D. Cal.
1960); Aboitiz & Co. v. Price, 99 F.Supp. 602, 610, 612 (D. Utah 1951). See also RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 7, § 102, Reporters' Note 2 (including international conferences), § 103, Com-
ment c and Reporters' Note 2, § 701, Reporters' Note 7; Memorandum for the United States in
Filartiga, supra note 19, at 593-94, 600-02; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 n.8 (1976) (as
"contemporary standards of decency"); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 12 & n. 1 (1919) (Report of
the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement and Penalties
of the Versailles Peace Conference, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1920)); M.A. v. I.N.S., 899
F.2d 304, 323 (4th Cir. 1990) (Winter, J., dissenting) (writings of Amnesty International and
Americas Watch "have long been considered a valid source of international law"); Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 426 (2d Cir. 1987); West v. Mul-
tibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 1987) (IMF Dir. of Legal Dep't.); Sanchez-
Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 800-01
& nn.22-23 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733, 737-38 (1 1th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1984); Cruz v. Zapata Ocean Re-
sources, Inc., 695 F.2d 428, 434 nn.1 1-12 (9th Cir. 1982); Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., Inc. 215
F.2d 547, 553 (Int'l Claims Comm'n); The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (text-
writer quoting international arbitration); United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F.Supp. 114,
154 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting "wide acceptance" of U.N. standard); R, HIGGINS, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
4-7 (1963); notes 25, 28 infra; but see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809, 818-
19 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
24. See, e.g., Texas v. Louisiana, 426 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515
(1975); United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 583 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1030
(1987); United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.3 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1114 (1982); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980); Forti v. Suarez-
Mason, 694 F.Supp. 707, 709-12 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Aidi v. Yaron, 672 F.Supp. 516, 519 n.4
(D.D.C. 1987) (affidavit used with brief); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F.Supp. 887, 902
(N.D. Ga.), modified, 781 F.2d 1450 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (a case otherwise in error, see Paust, supra
note 15, at 385-86); F.T.C. v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 493 F.Supp. 286,
294 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated, 636 F.2d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1980); United States v. Byrne, 422 F.Supp.
147, 164 n.15 (E.D. Pa. 1976), modified, 560 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045
(1978); Navios Corp. v. The Ulysses II, 161 F.Supp. 932, 941-43 (D. Md. 1958); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 7, § 113(2), Comment c and Reporters' Note I (citing Baade, Proving Foreign and
International Law in Domestic Tribunals, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 619 (1979)); F. BOYLE, DEFENDING
CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987); Panel, 70 PROC., AM. Soc. INT'L L.
10-15 (1976) (remarks of Baade, Carter, Goldie, Herzog, Lillich, Parry, Paust, Young; but see
remarks of Cardozo). These methods are utilizable by federal courts even though, or perhaps
precisely because, the courts will take judicial notice of and must apply international law in
appropriate cases. See notes 53-57 infra. Affidavits and testimony can be on questions of law
and mixed questions of law and fact at the discretion of the court.
25. See e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicargua (Nicar. v. U.S.)
1986 I.C.J. 14, 99-100, 101-02, 106-07; Namibia Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 3, 74-75; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 7, § 102, Reporters' Note 2 (citing Western Sahara (advisory opinion), 1975 I.C.J. 4,
31; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 24-26, 32), § 103, Comment c and
Reporters' Note 2, § 701, Reporters' Notes 2, 4; M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
Michigan Journal of International Law
instance of behavior, but the most relevant forms of behavior will
probably involve other patterns of action and inaction outside the
U.N. plaza.26 Importantly also, U.N. resolutions have been utilized by
U.S. courts as aids in identifying the content of customary interna-
tional law.
27
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 171 (1974); T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER, supra note 7, at 31-2,
44-5; L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 364-65; L. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 7, at 233-34, 236, 238, 247,
247-48 n.152; H. HANNUM, MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 4-5 (1985); M. JANIS, supra note 7, at 43-44; R. Lillich, The Current Status of
the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 1, 28-29 (R. Lillich ed. 1983); R. LILLICH & F. NEW-
MAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 65-67, 128 (1979);
W. MALLISON & S. MALLISON, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR UNITED
NATIONS RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE PALESTINE QUESTION 4 (1979); M. MCDOUGAL, H.
LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 272-74, 302, 325-30; H. THIRLWAY, supra note 12; B.
WESTON, R. FALK & A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 80 (1980);
Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Recitation of General Assembly Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT'L
L. 444, 447, 449-51, 477 (1969); Brown, Freedom of the High Seas Versus the Common Heritage
of Mankind: Fundamental Principles in Conflict, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 521, 538-41 (1983);
Castaneda, Valeur juridique des resolutions des Nations Unies, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 207
([1970 1] 1971); Charney, supra note 15, at 914-15 n.7, 916; Cheng, United Nations Resolutions
on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary Law?, 5 IND. J. INT'L L. 23 (1965); Czaplin-
ski, supra note 19, at 160; Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60
AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966); Ferrari-Bravo, supra note 9, at 249; Franck, Some Observations on
the ICJ's Procedural and Substantive Innovations, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 116, 118-19 (1987); Gasser,
supra note 14, at 32-33; Guertin, Customary International Law and Women's Rights: The Equal
Rights Amendment as a Fait Accompli, 1987 DETROIT COLL. L. REV. 121, 132 (1987); Hannum,
International Law and Cambodian Genocide. The Sounds of Silence, 11 H.R.Q. 82, 118-21
(1989); Higgins, supra note 14, at 38-40; 42-3, 46-8, 54-5; Holloway, Remarks, 64 (No. 4) AM. J.
INT'L L. 62 (1970); Humphrey, supra note 14; Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 12, at 12, 31-4;
Kirgis, supra note 12, at 147, 149; Lillich, supra note 25, at 70; MacDonald, The Nicaragua Case:
New Answers to Old Questions?, 24 CAN. Y. B. INT'L L. 127, 142 (1986); McDougal, remarks
(I1), supra note 14, at 328-29; McDougal, supra note 9, at 199, 204; Raman, supra note 7, at 393,
397; Richardson, Self-Determination, International Law and the South African Bantustan Policy,
17 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 185, 203 (1978); Rowles, supra note 7, at 316; Schachter, supra note 17,
at 114-18; Schreuer, The Relevance of United Nations Decisions in Domestic Litigation, 27 INT'L
& CoMp. L.Q. 1 (1978); Scheurer, The Impact of International Institutions on the Protection of
Human Rights in Domestic Courts, 4 ISRAEL Y.B. H.R. 60, 77-88 (1974); Sohn, Remarks, 75
PROC., AM. Soc. INT'L L. 192-93, 203-04 (1981) [hereinafter Sohn, Remarks (I)]; Remarks, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 61-62 (1977) [hereinafter Sohn, Remarks (11)]; The Human Rights Law of the
Charter, 12 Tex. Int'l L.J. 129, 133 (1977); Strossen, supra note 19, at 816-18; Treves, The UN
Body of Principles for the Protection of Detained or Imprisoned Persons, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 578,
585 (1990); Van Dyke & Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom of the High Seas": Which
Governs the Seabed?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493, 524-26 (1982); Wright, supra note 13; Zamora,
supra note 12, at 38; cf. Carnahan, Remarks, 81 PROC., AM. Soc. INT'L L. 35 (1987); Magraw,
Remarks, id. at 270-7 1; Morrison, Remarks, 81 PROC., AM. SOc. INT'L L. 261; Halberstam, Self-
Determination in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Meaning, Myth, and Politics, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 465, 469 (1989); Reisman, supra note 9, at 102-04, 108, 110, 119; Schwebel, Remarks, 73
PROC., AM. Soc. INT'L L. 301 (1979); but see D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law,
supra note 7, at 102 ("opinio juris has nothing to do with 'acceptance' of rules in such
documents").
26. See, e.g. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 102 Comment b and Reporters' Note 2; A.
D'AMATO, supra note 7, at 78-79; Higgins, supra note 14, at 47; Kirgis, supra note 12, at 148 n.9;
McDougal, supra note 9, at 199, 204; Reisman, Remarks, 79 PROC., AM. Soc. INT'L L. 278
(1985); Reisman, supra note 9, at 104, 106-07, 119-20; Schachter, supra note 17, at 118.
27. See note 23 supra.
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Yet it might also be unrealistic to depend entirely on a General
Assembly resolution to reflect relevant patterns of legal expectation.
General Assembly resolutions reflect a one-state-one-vote system that
can provide evidence of the legal expectations of humankind only if it
is assumed that each state adequately represents its people and that
somehow the actual vote reflects what would have been a weighted
voting pattern based on population numbers. When the General As-
sembly passes a unanimous or nearly unanimous resolution, the
chances are obviously greatly increased that one has an evidence of the
opinion of humankind. 28 Indeed, a unanimous resolution of the Gen-
eral Assembly may yet be the best evidence of such a pattern of expec-
tation, but such an evidence is not inherently perfect.
It can also be recognized that resolutions declaring international
law or applying such law after serious and notorious events presuma-
bly might better reflect well-considered and strong or intensely-held
preferences of the international community. 29 When one can identify
a series of such resolutions through time, one can also rightly assume
that such preferences or expectations are relatively stable within a
given period and if they are matched with generally conforming be-
havior, one has evidence of a relatively stable customary norm.
Importantly, however, no single institutional arrangement neces-
sarily reflects what other real people (outside of a particular institu-
tional process) actually think and do. The most thorough inquiry
28. See e.g., United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case), 3 Trials of War Criminals Before
the Nuremberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1946-1949, 3, 979 (1950)
("The General Assembly is not an international legislature, but it is the most authoritative organ
in existence for the interpretation of world opinion. Its recognition of genocide as an interna-
tional crime is persuasive evidence of the fact."); L. CHEN, supra note 4, at 364-65 ("a new
institutional mode by which the peoples of the world can clearly communicate expectations of
authority and control..."); cf. id. at 60, 369; T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER, supra note 7, at 45;
Bhatt, Remarks, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 56 (1970); Jiminez de Arechaga, supra note 12, at 34 ("the
'town meeting of the world' "); McDougal, Remarks (II), supra note 14, at 328-29; Sohn, Re-
marks (I), supra note 25, at 203-04; Sohn, Remarks (I1), supra note 25, at 61-62; but see
D'AMATO, supra note 7, at 102; Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal
Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 819 & n.41 (1990) (missing the point about unanimous resolu-
tions, especially those addressing international law); Trimble, supra note 7, at 680-81 & n.60.
29. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 102, Comment b and Reporters' Note 2; L.
CHEN, supra note 4, at 365; Sohn, Remarks (I), supra note 25, at 203-04; Sohn, Remarks (II),
supra note 25, at 61-62; but see D'Amato, supra note 7, at 102. It has also been suggested that
the views of "important" States or those 
" 
'whose interests were particularly affected' " should
have some special weight or consideration. See RESTATEMENT, supra, Reporters' Notes 2 and 5
(quoting, the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42); Charney, supra note 14, at
19, 23; Schwebel, supra note 25, at 305, 307-08, 331-32. Participation of such States might assure
a more serious, thorough and realistic consideration of normative content, alternatives, and likely
consequences. Yet ultimately the views of the entire community, however shaped by such partic-
ipation, are determinative. See also A. D'AMATO, supra note 7, at 65-66, 68-70; Christenson,
supra note 15, at 97 n. 13, 101 (citing Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?,
77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 441 (1983)); McDougal, Remarks (II), supra note 14, at 328-29, 332;
Raman, supra note 7, at 369, 372, 375, 384-86, 388; cf. Higgins, supra note 14, at 42, 44.
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would test each institutional decision not merely with respect to ongo-
ing patterns of relevant behavior, but also with respect to the common
or generally accepted opinions of humankind about what is legally ap-
propriate or required. In this sense, the thorough researcher's task is
to investigate the ongoing "process of review" to which each institu-
tional decision actually is subject. 30 Here again, far less than perfect
investigation has been accepted, but knowing what should be investi-
gated, what may be missing, can have important and realistic
influences.
With respect to general practice, it is also important to note that
"inaction" or compliance because of a choice to not violate a norm
may often be more relevant than the nonconforming practice of a few
violators of the norm,31 and yet such a practice may be difficult to
30. On the "process of review," see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 9; Paust,
supra note 12, at 231-38, passim; Reisman, supra note 9, at 106-07, 113; W.M. REISMAN, NUL-
LITY AND REVISION-THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS
AND AWARDS 3-4, 239 (1971); see also McDougal, remarks (I), supra note 14, at 56 ("It is not so
much. . . the intent of the communictors. . . that is important, as the expectations that are
created... in the larger community of mankind"-the same point can be made about particular
words or phrases printed in some document, i.e., what is of primary import is the opinio attached
thereto by the community).
Some pretend that decisions of constituted elites are necessarily authoritative, thereby confus-
ing primary authority with that delegated to official elites and ignoring the "review" of elite
decisions in ongoing domestic and international processes. See, e.g., Maier, supra note 10, at
453-54 & n.10, 455, 459, 461, 474-75; Maier, Ethics, Law and Politics, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 190,
193-94 (1990) [hereinafter Maier, Ethics]; see also D'AMATO, supra note 7, at 102; but see Jay,
supra note 14, at 836-37; Maier, supra at 194-95 (recognizing the theoretically inconsistent view-
point that "[i]n each instance the authority to act and the legitimacy of that authority is created
by public acceptance ... Official actors are nothing more than persons whose power the state's
populace has clothed with authority by accepting the legitimacy of their exercises of power.").
Professor Maier's general theoretic construct is also admittedly "dualist" at base and assumes,
equally unrealistically, that "legal rules . . . can have no applicability . . . without the active
affirmative participation of ... authoritative decision-makers." Maier, supra note 10, at 456 &
n.18; see also id. at 461 ("rule has whatever authority is attributable to the decisions of the
institution of government"), 465 n.59 (dualism, "entirely independent but congruent systems");
Maier, Ethics, supra, at 193-94; but see id., at 194-95. Not surprisingly, such a positivist orienta-
tion leads not merely to the conclusion that we are basically stuck with the decisions of elites that
we have constituted but also to speculations that they can ignore or even violate customary
international law (perhaps prohibitions of genocide, war crimes and torture). See Maier, supra
note 10, at 455, 470-71, 480; see also Maier, Remarks, 80 PROC., AM. SOC. INT'L L. 298 (1986);
Weisburd, supra note 15, at 1254-56; but see Franck, Remarks, 80 PROC., AM. Soc. INT'L L. 307
(1986); Charney, Remarks, 80 PROC., AM. SOC. INT'L L. 308 (1986). State-centric views (see
note 7 supra) are also necessarily less than fully realistic, disentangled as they are from a "com-
mon sense" of real human beings and "real world" processes of authority and power in which
individuals, with varied value positions (see note 9, supra), participate. On authority and rele-
vant international legal standards, see, e.g., Paust, Authority: From a Human Rights Perspective,
28 AM. J. JURIS. 64 (1983); Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment. A New Form of
Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231, 236-37, 240-44, 252, 266 (1975), reprinted in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (P. Murphy ed. 1990); Paust, supra note 12.
31. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 102 Comment b; T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER,
supra note 7, at 23; L. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 7, at 232; Hartman, supra note 14, at 669;
Perluss & Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L.
551, 556-57, 577-78 (1986); Raman, supra note 7, at 390; Zamora, supra note 12, at 19 n.48; A.
D'AMATO, supra note 7, at 61-63, 88-89; but see id. at 82-83. See also L. HANNIKAINEN, supra
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measure. Knowing what behavioral patterns should be measured and
what should not be unduly emphasized, however, can also have impor-
tant consequences with respect to research and choice about the for-
mation, change and termination of customary law. Too often
textwriters argue that the death of a norm, even a treaty norm, has
occurred because of the actions of a few States. Instead, what should
be investigated are the patterns of expectation more generally extant
(including those even of such law violators), and the actions and inac-
tions of all participants. It is also too simplistic to argue that law vio-
lations which, in a relatively unorganized community, have not been
subject to effective sanctions have, therefore, necessarily led to the de-
mise of a customary norm. It would be ludicrous to argue, for exam-
ple, that when a law-violating official elite of a State knows that its
actions are prohibited by customary law, when others generally expect
that such conduct is and remains illegal, and when violations are
scarce, the customary norm is obviated by a failure effectively to en-
sure sanctions against such an elite. Even in a relatively organized
community the lack of effective sanctions against several law violators
(e.g., several of those who commit murder) does not necessarily lead
one to the conclusion that a norm (e.g., the prohibition of murder) has
thereby been obviated.
CONSTITUTIONAL BASES AND STATUS
Although customary international law has been incorporated both
directly and indirectly in civil and criminal cases from the beginning of
the United States, 32 the only express reference to the "law of nations"
note 7, at 235; Kirgis, supra note 12, at 147 n.8 (citing Case Concering Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. paras. 206-08 reprinted in 25
I.L.M 1023, 1069-71 (1956)(even law violators "have not justified their conduct by reference to a
new right ... or a new exception to the principle...")); id. at para. 186; Memorandum for the
United States at 16, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090) ("While
some nations still practice torture, it appears that no state asserts a right to torture ... Rather,
nations accused ... unanimously deny the accusation and make no attempt to justify its use.
That conduct evidences an awareness that torture is universally condemned."); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880, 884 n.15; The Emulous, 8 F. Cas. 697, 701-02 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
4,479) ("Surely a relaxation of the law in practice cannot be admitted to constitute an abolition in
principle, when the principle is asserted .. "); Meron, supra note 4, at 369 (citing Schachter,
supra note 17, at 336 ("episodic breaches" are relatively unimportant and a better consideration
is "the 'intensity and depth of the attitudes of condemnation' " extant in the community)); Mul-
lerson, supra note 15, at 506; Schneebaum, International Law as Guarantor of Judicially-Enforce-
able Rights: A Reply to Professor Oliver, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 65, 67 (1981).
32. See, e.g., Paust, On Human Rights. The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and
the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 620-25 (1989).
Professor Strossen has remarked that customary international law has "played a less vital part in
domestic adjudication" from the mid-19th century until the mid-20th. See Strossen, supra note
19, at 818. But Lexis demonstrates a major increase in use of the terms "law of nations" or
"international law" since 1900 in all but the Supreme Court, and the same holds for the periods
1900-1940 or 1900-1950 when compared with use in the 18th and 19th centuries combined. It is
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found in the Constitution is that aligned with a Congressional power
(i.e., Article I, Section 8, clause 10). 3 3 It would be too simplistic to
assume, however, that incorporation of customary international law
has no other adequate constitutional base. Moreover, it is too simplis-
tic to argue that customary international law is incorporable merely as
some sort of "common law,"'34 the latter view ignoring even the ex-
nonetheless true that use in the last 45 years is markedly more frequent (in the circuit and district
courts) than in the first 45 years of this century.
33. Such is the concurrent power of Congress to define and punish offenses against the law of
nations. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10. For an early draft of another constitutional provision
containing the phrase "Law of Nations" and its implications, see Paust, supra note 32, at 622-23
n.501; see also Jay, supra note 14, at 829-33.
34. That customary international law was thought to be not merely "common" law or "gen-
eral law" but much more and of a higher transnational status (despite general rhetoric that
customary international law was also "part of" the common law), see, e.g., Henkin, International
Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1561-62, 1564-65 (1984); Paust, supra
note 1, at 441 n.91. See also First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622-23 (1983) (one party contends international law governs, other party
contends federal common law governs, but relevant principles "are common to both interna-
tional and federal common law" and the latter is "necessarily informed... by international law
principles" -implication: they are not exactly the same); Guessefeldt v. McGarth, 342 U.S. 308,
318 (1952) ("at common and international law"-implication: same as above); Johnson v. Eisen-
trager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950)("rule of the common law and the law of nations"-implication:
same as above); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 7 (1942) (argument of counsel: "international law
analogous to common law"-implication: same as above); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361,
383 (1934) ("International law... like the common law within states" - implication: same as
above); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 393 (1929) (argument of counsel: "The doctrines of
international law... and not the common law doctrine.., is the governing law of this case" -
implication: they are not the same); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 207 (1923) (argument of
counsel: "common law rule was in accord with the law of nations" - implication: same as
above); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 231 (1917) (Pitney, J., dissenting) ("the law
of nations, the law of admiralty and maritime, the common law, including commercial law...
Upon these foundations the Constitution was erected." - implication: these sorts of law are not
exactly the same); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 308 (1915) ("principles of the common law
and international law" - implication: same as above); Herrera v. United States, 222 U.S. 558,
560 (1912) (argument of counsel: "both under the common law and the law of nations" - impli-
cation: same as above); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 213 (1906) ("as a question of common
law or of the law of nations" - implication: same as above); National Council U.A.M. v. State
Council of Virginia, 203 U.S. 151, 153 (1906) (argument of counsel: "what by common law and
the law of nations" - implication: same as above); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 192 (1892) ("as a
question of common law or of the law of nations" -implication: they are not the same); Ker v.
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) ("as a question of common law, or of the law of nations" -
implication: same as above); New Orleans, M. & T. Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135,
137 (1880) ("by the common law and the law of nations" - implication: same as above); Sprott
v. United States, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 459, 471 (1874) (Field, J., dissenting) (not on common law
doctrines but "on higher ground... international law"); United States v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 284, 290-91 (1854) (argument of counsel: "there are no common law offices,
... [a]ll ... are created, either by the law of nations... or by the constitution and the statutes" -
implication: common law is not the same as law of nations); Prigg v. Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 670 (1842) (M'Lean, J., dissenting) ("sanctioned neither by the
common law nor the law of nations" - implication: they are not the same); Martin v. Lessee of
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 393 (1842) (argument of counsel: "must be judged of, not by the
common law, but according to the law of nations" - implication: same as above); United States
v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 553 (1841) (argument of counsel: "of the com-
mon law, or of the law of nations" - implication: same as above); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S.(3
Pet.) 242, 248 (1830) (Story, J.) ("common law.., civil rights... [are] not... political rights
[which]... stand upon the more general principles of the law of nations.") (quoted in United
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States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 660 (1898), id. at 707-08 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting));
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820)("law of nations... The common law,
too... . writers on the common law .., or the law of nations..." - implication: they are not
exactly the same); M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 324 (1804) (argument of
counsel: "I deny that this common law principle is founded in, or consonant to,... the law of
nations"); Duncanson v. M'Lure, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 308, 312 (1804) (argument of counsel: "on
principles of the law of nations, as well as on principles of the common law" - implication: they
are not the same); Group No. One Oil Corp. v. Bass, 38 F.2d 680, 684 (W.D. Tex.) ("the com-
mon law, or the law of nations" -implication: same as above), rev'd, 41 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.
1930); In re Lynch, 31 F.2d 762, 762 (S.D. Cal. 1929) (quoting Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 242 (1830)); Martin v. United States, 278 F. 913, 916 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820)); Ex parte Lamar, 274 F. 160, 169 (2d Cir. 1921) (quoting
Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 213 (1906)), aff'd 260 U.S. 711 (1922); Stumpf v. A. Schrei-
ber Brewing Co., 242 F. 80, 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1917) ("international law, as distinguished from the
common law"); Oliver v. United States, 230 F. 971, 973 (9th Cir. 1916) ("a name known to the
law of nations or to the common law.., not less clearly ascertained than it would be by using the
definition as found in the treatises of the common law, or in the law of nations" - implication:
they are not exactly the same); Canada-Atlantic & Plant S.S. Co. v. Flanders, 145 F. 875, 880
(1st Cir. 1906) ("The same rule applies at common law .. , although not so under the interna-
tional law."-implication: they are not the same); Pacific Gas Improvement Co. v. Ellert, 64 F.
421, 432 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1894) ("by the law of nations, and the common and civil law," (quoting
Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80, 87 (1854)) - implication: none are the same); In re Ezeta, 62 F.
964, 968 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (quoting Kerr v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886)); Murray v. Chi-
cago & N.W. Ry. Co., 62 F. 24, 29, 31, 34, 37, 41-42 (C.C.D. Iowa 1894) ("the several branches
of the law, such as the law of nations, the common law, the admiralty and maritime law..."),
aff'd, 92 F. 868 (8th Cir. 1899); United States v. Tully, 28 F. Cas. 226, 229 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812)
(No. 16,545) (piracy "by the law of nations" is different than piracy "by the common law");
United States v. O'Sullivan, 27 F. Cas. 367, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 15,974) ("local or com-
mon law" treated as different than "law of nations"); United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 655,
657 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 15,494) ("not to be found in the.., act of congress, nor in the
common law, or law of nations..."); United States v. Hand, 26 F. Cas. 103, 104 (C.C.D. Pa.
1810) (No. 15,297) (regarding evidence and charge of "infracting the law of nations... [u]pon
common law principles, such evidence would seem inapplicable to such a charge. But the act of
congress refers us to the law of nations for our test .. "); Rundle v. Delaware & R. Canal, 21 F.
Cas. 6, 11 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 12,139) ("not by any principles of international law, but by
the common law..."); Giltner v. Gorham, 10 F. Cas. 424, 425 (C.C.D. Mi. 1848) (No. 5,453)
("no principle of the common law, or of the law of nations..."); The Emulous, 8 F. Cas. 697, 700
(C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 4, 479) ("if the law of nations does not, the common law does"); id. at
703 ("by the rigor of the law of nations, and of the common law... Such is also the rule of the
common law."); Driskill v. Parrish, 7 F. Cas. 1100, 1101 (C.C.D. Ohio 1845) (No. 4,089)
("neither the laws of nations nor the common law..."); Crawford v. The William Penn, 6 F. Cas.
778, 780 (C.C.D. N.J. 1815) (No. 3,372) ("rigid rule of the common law" does not "apply in all
its rigor, to courts acting under the general law of nations, and proceeding according to the civil
law"); Coolidge v. Guthrie, 6 F. Cas. 461, 463 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1868) (No. 3,185) ("not trespasses
by the common law.., only by the law of nations..."); Baglab Ltd. v. Johnson Matthey Bankers
Ltd., 665 F.Supp. 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting First National City Bank v. Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 622-23 (1983)); Marlow v. Argentine Naval Commis-
sion, 604 F.Supp. 703, 705 (D.D.C. 1985) (same); Hadden v. Rumsey Products, Inc., 96 F.Supp.
988, 992 (W.D.N.Y. 1951) (quoting Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495, 540-41 (1850)
wherein admiralty was related to "laws of nations" and "court of common law" was related to
"the municipal laws of the states") rev'd, 196 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1952); In re Reid, 6 F.Supp. 800,
805 (D. Ore. 1934) ("both common and international law" - implication: they are not exactly
the same); C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WAR 128-29 (P. DuPonceau
trans. 1810) (important question occurs "whether an act of piracy, clearly considered as such by
the law of nations, may be inquired of, and punished... although it should not be piracy at
common law, nor be expressly provided for by statute? The learned Wooddeson is in favor of the
affirmative" (quoting I WOODES 140)); Charney, supra note 15, at 918 n.14; Jay, supra note 14,
at 843-45; Paust, supra note 1, at 416-21, 419 n.55, 442; supra note 14; infra notes 56-57; cf.
Goodwin, International Law in the Federal Courts, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 157, 158 ("federal
international common law"), 161 (1990); but see The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn.,
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press Congressional power to include such law in a statutory scheme35
or, more particularly (as the Supreme Court has recognized in certain
instances), to incorporate such law "by reference."' 36 In contradistinc-
tion to both such assertions, it is evident that several of the amend-
ments to the U.S. Constitution (especially the ninth amendment) have
a purpose to serve human rights based in customary international
law37 and, therefore, that incorporation of several customary rights is
1925); M. JANIS, supra note 7, at 84-85; Kirgis, Federal Statutes, Executive Orders and "Self-
Executing Custom," 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371, 373 (1987) (citing Glennon, supra note 15, at 923
and Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the
Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 321, 343-47 (1985)); Weisburd, supra note 15, at
1208, 1214, 1234-39, 1251; id. at 1234-39, 1246-47, 1250 (also ignoring certain constitutional
bases for the application of customary international law or disagreeing that other bases exist).
It is also of interest that despite the significant decision of the Supreme Court in 1812 that
there are to be no "common law" crimes as such (See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-33 (1812); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 209, 210 (1818)), subsequent cases did not
invalidate indictments based on the "law of nations." See cases and opinions cited infra note 51.
Thus, it is evident that certain judges and others thought that the law of nations was directly
incorporable for criminal sanction purposes and was not merely "common law."
Professor Weisburd's analyses on this point rely heavily upon "maritime" (not customary
international) law and cases applying such law. See, e.g., Weisburd, supra note 15, at 1214-17,
1238; cf. id. at 1216, 1238 (citing The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 572 (1874)) and
arguing that language therein to the effect that "international law or the laws of war... have the
effect of law in no country any further than they are accepted and received as such" necessarily
states that international law is "law" in the United States "only to the extent it was adopted in
the United States." Of course the dictum in The Lottawanna, thus interpreted, would be incor-
rect (or, perhaps, merely a truism -i.e., have "effect" if "accepted and received") in view of
actual trends in decision, and it need not be so interpreted. The phrase "accepted and received as
such" could mean "accepted and received as" international law (and even "accepted and re-
ceived" by the judiciary). Further, a phrase "adopted by the laws" of a country would not
necessarily exclude "adoption" by or thru the U.S. Constitution. For several reasons, The Lot-
tawanna dictum proves nothing-especially when the Court recognized that "no one doubts that
every nation may adopt its own maritime code... no nation regards itself as precluded... Each
state adopts the maritime law, not as a code having any independent or inherent force, proprio
vigore, but as its own law, with such modifications and qualifications as it sees fit." The Lot-
tawanna 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 572-73 (1874). Such a circumstance is hardly comparable to
that surrounding customary international law. See also supra notes 10, 14. Moreover, Justice
Bradley, who wrote the opinion in The Lottawanna later insisted that "unwritten international
law" as such is "law" or among the "laws of the United States." See New York Life Insurance v.
Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 287-88 (1875) (Bradley, J., dissenting)(This is an interpretation that Pro-
fessor Weisburd does not prefer. See Weisburd, supra note 15, at 1219); see also Amy v. City of
Watertown, 130 U.S. 320, 326 (1888) (Bradley, J.) ("the Law of Nations forbids... this general
exception created by Act of law"); Coffee v. Groover, 123 U.S. 1, 9 (1887) (Bradley, J.) ("took
broader ground, and held, as a general principle of international law"). Further, other cases had
already recognized a difference between "the law of nations and the general maritime law." See,
e.g., United States v. Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 235 (1844); The
Meteor, 17 F. Cas. 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 9,498) ("the general principles of the maritime
law and the law of nations.").
35. See supra note 33. Potentially any congressional power could be implicated, including
the necessary and proper clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18). See infra note 43.
36. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1942); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153, 160-62. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
37. See Paust, supra note 32, at 558-59, 567, 597, 599-600,passim; Richardson, Remarks, 81
PROC., AM. Soc. INT'L L. 528 (1987). See also Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 215,
219 (1926) (argument of counsel: if Congressional resolution works a "confiscation" it "is uncon-
stitutional because it violates international law"); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1463 (it has
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possible through the use of certain constitutional amendments. Thus,
in these instances there are both different constitutional bases for in-
corporation and a status far different than that of mere common law
or even an implementing statute.
Further, is was recognized early that customary international law
in general is also a part of the laws of the United States. 38 As such,
customary international law is relevant both with respect to the duty
and the power of the Executive under Article II, section 3 to "take
care that the Laws be faithfully executed."3 9 Supreme Court and
never "been suggested that the First Amendment is incompatible with the United States' most
basic obligations under the law of nations. The two must be accommodated...") (emphasis
added), rev'd in part and aff'd in part sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322-329 (1988); 485
U.S. at 324 (Justice O'Connor adding: "the fact that an interest is recognized in international law
does not automatically render that interest 'compelling' for purposes of First Amendment analy-
sis. We need not decide today whether, or to what extent, the dictates of international law could
ever require that First Amendment analysis be adjusted to accommodate the interests of foreign
officials."); Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. L. REV. 349,
406 (1988); cf United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1980). Of course
generally one tries to interpret domestic law consistently with our international obligations. See,
e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 400 n.9, 403-05 n.15; Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982);
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-21 (1963); United
States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 159 (1933); MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913);
United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 (1 1th Cir. 1982); United States v. Reagan,
453 F.2d 165, 170 (6th Cir. 1971); Von Dardel v. USSR, 623 F.Supp. 246, 253-54 (D.D.C. 1985),
vacated, 736 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C 1990); Reston v. F.C.C., 492 F.Supp. 697, 707 (D.D.C. 1980)
38. See infra note 44 and accompanying text; The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423
(1815); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133, 156 (Paterson, J.), 159-61 (Iredell, J.) (1795); 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 566, 570-71 (1822); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792);
supra notes 14, 17, 32; see also Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 276-77 (1808) (Marshall,
C.J.) ("the law of nations is the law of all tribunals in the society of nations"); United States v. La
Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) ("may be enforced by a
court ofjustice, whenever it arises in judgment"); Glass v. The Sloop Betsy, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 6, 16
(1794) (district court is "competent to enquire, and to decide, whether ... restitution can be
made consistently with the law of nations"); Miller v. The Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 1, 4
(1781) ("by the law of nations" a private person has the right to "pursue and recover" property
taken in violation of such law); THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 589 (A. Hamilton) (J.C. Hamilton
ed. 1868) ("cases arising upon ... the laws of nations" are appropriate); THE FEDERALIST No. 3,
at 62 (J. Jay) (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1868) ("law of nations," in federal system, "will always be
expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner..."); infra notes 44-45, 50, 56.
39. See E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 125 (1973); E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 177 (1984); A. MILLER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A NUTSHELL
105-06 (1977); Henkin, supra note 34, at 1567 ("There can be little doubt that the President has
the duty, as well as the authority, to take care that international law ... is faithfully executed.
The President does that regularly .. "); Jay, supra note 14, at 833-35, 847-48; Miller, The
President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 403, 405 (1987); Paust,
supra note 15; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 22 (1901) (argument of counsel); Brown v. United
States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 145-47, 149, 153 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting); I Op. Att'y Gen.
566, 569-71 (1822) (duty and power); see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 191, 193 (3d ed. 1986); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 318-20 (1936); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942) ("The Constitution thus invests the
President ... with the power ... to carry into effect ... all laws defining and punishing offenses
against the law of nations..."); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1890) (does this duty "include
the rights, duties, and obligations growing out of ... our international relations...?"); In re The
Nuestra Sefiora de Regla, 108 U.S. 92, 102 (1882) ("It is objected, however, that the executive
department of the Government had no power.... It was the duty of the United States, under the
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other opinions have also recognized that while exercising Presidential
war powers, the Executive is bound by customary international law. 4°
Additionally, judicial opinions and the opinions of Attorneys General
law of nations .... The executive department had the right .. "); United States v. Cooke (The
Venice), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 258, 268 (1865) (argument of counsel: "The duty of the President...
was to destroy the trade.., in every way sanctioned by the law of nations"); The Prize Cases, 67
U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668-69, 671 ("[President had a right, jure belli," and was "bound" to act);
The Flying Fish, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804) ("It is by no means clear that the President of
the United States, whose high duty it is to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' . . .
might not, without any special authority..." have executed a right or power under the law of
nations, but an act of Congress existed and, in that instance, controlled Executive power concern-
ing the seizure of vessels in time of limited hostilities); United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825,
867-68 (append.) (D.C.D. So. Car. 1799) (No. 16,175) (Rep. Marshall); Dole v. Carter, 444
F.Supp. 1065, 1069 (D. Kan. 1977); 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 291, 292 (1914); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297,
298-300, 305, 309-10, 316 (1865) (this opinion found practical application in Ex parte Mudd,
manuscript opinion, otherwise reported at 17 F. Cas. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1868) (No. 9,899)); State v.
Stillman, 47 Tenn. (7 Cold.) 341, 347-53 (1870) (powers of military commissions); Hefferman v.
Porter, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 391, 395-99 (1869) (same); United States v. Reiter, 13 Am. Law Reg.
534, 536 (Provisional Ct. for La. 1865); Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), in 15 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 40, 43 (1969) (President is "charged with the execution
of all laws," including the law of nations, and President has "a right, and.., duty, as Executor of
the laws .. "); Paust, supra note 14; cf. Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 231 (1901)
(quoting HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW) ("powers of such government [by military occupa-
tion] are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws
of war... the law of nations"); United States v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 290-91 (1854)
(argument of counsel: "[O]ffices under the government of the United States are created [in some
instances] ... by the law of nations"); Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 515 (1851)
("[n]either the President nor any military officer can establish a court [of the United States] ...
to administer the laws of nations. The courts, established or sanctioned in Mexico during the
war .. were nothing more than agents of the military power .... They were not courts of the
United States .. "); In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 483 n.13 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 487 U.S. 654
(1988); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 636-37 (3d Cir. 1974) (Gibbons, J., dissenting in
part); but see I Op. Att'y Gen. 509, 521 (1821) (even if an obligation existed for the United States
under customary law, "still the President has no power to make delivery [of a fugitive]. The
constitution, and the treaties, and acts of Congress made under its authority, comprise the whole
of the President's powers .. "); Glennon, supra note 34, at 337-39 & n. 117 (re: his reading of
Brown, the "usage" error, and enhancement of Presidential power); Steinhardt, supra note 10, at
1109, 1170 n.287; Trimble, supra note 7, at 675; Weisburd, supra note 15, at 1207, 1209 ("few
judicial constructions . . . [of the take care clause] exist, and [declaring wrongly] none has ad-
dressed the issue of whether the clause applies to customary international law"), 1233, 1251,
passim.
The President's power to enforce customary international law is necessarily interconnected
with the President's duty faithfully to execute such law and such a power can be enhanced by the
applicability of any other Executive power. See also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 54-56 (1972); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 298-300, 305, 309-10, 316 (1865); 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 566, 569-71 (1822). Perhaps ironically, the very fact that the President is bound by
international law can lead to an enhancement of Executive power in particular circumstances.
That is, of course, unless some other constitutional requirement prohibits or conditions executive
action - such as that connected with an exclusive power in Congress to declare war or a consti-
tutional amendment relevant to powers of extradition. On this last point, see also Valentine v.
United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). Thus, it is evident that the President's power
to execute customary international law, like any other governmental power, can be restrained
not only by such law, but also by certain provisions of the Constitution. Significantly also, no
textual provision of the Constitution authorizes the President or any other public official to vio-
late international law or to ignore its intended effect as law of the United States.
40. See Paust, supra note 15, at 379-82, and references cited; Paust, Is the President Bound by
the Supreme Law of the Land? - Foreign Affairs and National Security Reexamined, 9 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 719, 727 n.24, 751-53 (1982); but see id. at 727-28 n.24.
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have recognized that customary international law can limit the exer-
cise of an otherwise appropriate Congressional power and thus can
function partly as an aid for interpreting the extent of constitutional
grants of power.4' And, of course, customary international law may
be relevant to an adequate interpretation of various sorts of Congres-
41. See Paust, supra note 1, at 416-43, and references cited (also recognizing that in the case
of an unavoidable clash between a federal statute and customary international law, especially
customary jus cogens, the more widely shared and authoritative preference is that customary
international law prevail); Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331, 354-55 (1871) (Field, J.,
dissenting); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981); United
States ex rel. Schlueter v. Watkins, 67 F.Supp. 556, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (quoting Albert Galla-
tin in 1798: "By virtue of... [the war power], Congress could... [act], provided it be according
to the laws of nations and to treaties"); but see (since the cited article, but without awareness or
analysis of the conflicting line of cases and opinions) United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248
n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (dictum) (citing United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1990)
(dictum); and Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935, 938-39
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (reading dictum in The Paquete Habana too broadly but adding nonetheless
that peremptory norms of customary international law "may well" prevail over any inconsistent
federal statute (see id. at 935, 940-41), a preference explored in Paust, supra note 1, at 442-43 &
n.104)); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 537 (1839) (argument of counsel);
United States v. Siem, 299 F. 582, 583 (9th Cir. 1924) ("[I]nternational law is not in itself binding
upon Congress." - no authorities cited for such); American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v.
Meese, 712 F.Supp. 756, 770-71 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (also since the cited article but without refer-
ences to the conflicting cases and opinions); Paust, supra note 1, at 425-27 (re: contrary cases
analyzed therein); Steinhardt, supra note 10, at 1163, 1167-68, 1170, 1173-74, 1185; infra note 52
(dictum). See also Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369, 393 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, J.,
concurring) ("The court in [Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua] distinguished between
"customary" and "peremptory" norms of international law, and left open the possibility that
"peremptory" norms might supersede domestic law. "Peremptory" norms are those principles
of international law deemed so fundamental that no deviation from them is permitted."); Lillich,
supra note 19, at 70 (custom "perhaps may supersede"); Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional
Power. Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1134-47
(1985); Note, The Role of International Law in Domestic Courts. Will the Legal Procrastination
End?, 14 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 99, 117-23 (1990) (judicial opinions preferring federal stat-
utes over international customary law are poorly reasoned and are not preferable); supra notes
10, 14.
Several lower court opinions have also quoted or paraphrased United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931) (analyzed in Paust, supra note 1, at 417, with respect to language
recognizing "limitations" to the war power "found ... in applicable principles of international
law"), rev'd on other grounds, Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1945). See Taylor v.
Brown, 137 F.2d 654, 657 (Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 787 (1943); Kovach v. Mid-
dendorf, 424 F.Supp. 72, 79 (D. Del. 1976); United States v. Seeger, 216 F.Supp. 516, 521-22
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); United States v.
Steinel, 70 F.Supp. 966, 968 (D. Conn. 1946); Commers v. United States, 66 F.Supp. 943, 947
(D. Mont. 1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 248 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 807 (1947); Gray v. Com-
modity Credit Corp., 63 F.Supp. 386, 388 (S.D. Cal. 1945), aff'd, 159 F.2d 243 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 842 (1947); Exparte Yost, 55 F.Supp. 768, 770 (S.D. Cal. 1944); United States
v. Hutchinson, 55 F.Supp. 648, 650 (D. Colo.), aff'd sub nom., Roodenko v. United States, 147
F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 860 (1945); United States ex rel. Zucker v.
Osborne, 54 F.Supp. 984, 986 (W.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 147 F.2d 135, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 881
(1945); Ebel v. Drum, 52 F.Supp. 189, 194 (D. Mass. 1943); United States v. Beit Bros., 50
F.Supp. 590, 591 (D. Conn. 1943); Henderson v. Kimmel, 47 F.Supp. 635, 641 n.7 (D. Kan.
1942). See also Miller v. Kaliwerke Aschersleben Aktien-Gesellschaft, 283 F. 746, 751 (2d Cir.
1922) (quoting Justice Field's dissent in Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 314
(1870) (re: "war powers of the government," "the only limitation to which their exercise is sub-
ject is the law of nations").
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sional power in order functionally to enhance such powers. 42 Signifi-
cantly, the latter process of incorporation might include an
enhancement of the power of Congress under Article I, section 8,
clause 18 to enact legislation "necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution... all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof."
43
Though not widely understood, the judicial power to identify, clar-
ify and apply customary international law in cases otherwise properly
before the courts is also constitutionally based. Under Article III, sec-
tion 2, clause 1 of the Constitution not only might matters involving
customary international law arise under other parts of the Constitu-
tion as such (as noted above) or treaties, but they can also arise under
"the Laws of the United States." Indeed, as recognized by the first
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, the phrase "the laws of the
United States" includes the customary "law of nations." 4 Thus,
42. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1972); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705-14
(1893); Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 541, 545 (1880); Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 331, 354-55 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268,
316 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting) ("Whatever any independent civilized nation may do in the
prosecution of war, according to the law of nations, Congress, under the Constitution, may au-
thorize to be done .. "); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1454-57, 1460, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); Rodri-
guez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Farr, Whitlock & Co., 383 F.2d 166, 182, 185 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956, reh'g
denied, 390 U.S. 103 (1968); Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 489 F.Supp. 526, 529 (E.D. Va.
1980), aff'd, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Letelier v. Republic
of Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665, 668-69 & n.3 (D.D.C. 1980); Jewish Defense League, Inc. v. Washing-
ton, 347 F.Supp. 1300, 1301-02 (D.D.C. 1972); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F.Supp. 479
490-91 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (adding: "(H]aving found that the protective principle exists as a recog-
nized doctrine of international law, or the 'Law of Nations,' it becomes a principle that Congress
can rightfully incorporate into its legislation .... ); I Op. Att'y Gen. 52, 53 (1794) ("municipal
law is strengthened by the law of nations"); infra note 43; cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
369 (1901) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
43. See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 483-85, 487-88 (1887) ("right ... given by the
law of nations ... the United States ... are bound to protect. Consequently, a law which is
necessary and proper to afford this protection is one that Congress may enact, because it is one
that is needed to carry into execution a power conferred by the Constitution on the Government
of the United States .. "). Importantly, it is neither necessary "for carrying into execution" the
constitutional powers of the government nor proper for Congress to pass legislation violative of
rights or duties under customary international law. See supra note 41; see also supra note 14;
infra notes 56, 57; Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691, 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
44. See Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1101 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (Jay, C.J.). See
also id. at 1103-04, 1112, 1115; Chief Justice Jay, Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of
Virginia (May 22, 1793) ("The Constitution, the statutes of Congress, the laws of nations, and
treaties constitutionally made compose the laws of the United States"), in 3 THE CORRESPON-
DENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 479 (H. Johnston ed. 1891); New York Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 287-88 (1875) (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("unwritten
international law" is among the "laws of the United States") (cf id. at 286-87); Caperton v.
Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216, 226 (1872) (argument of counsel: "law of nations, part of the law
of the United States."); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
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although treaties have an express constitutional base in Article III, a
primary base for judicial incorporation of customary international law
also exists in the phrase "Laws of the United States" found in the
same Article. The same point can be made with respect to Article VI,
clause 2 of the Constitution, which affirms that both treaties and "the
Laws of the United States" are "the supreme Law of the Land."
As the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States recognizes: "Matters arising under customary interna-
475 U.S. 1016 (1986) ("law of the United States includes international law"); Laker Airways Ltd.
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 951 n.159 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("part of United
States laws"); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) (re: claim as to "part of
the laws of the United States"); District of Columbia v. International Distributing Corp., 331
F.2d 817, 820 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ("It has long been recognized that international law is part of
the law of the United States."); Warren County, Pa. v. Southern Surety Co., 34 F.2d 168, 170
(E.D. Pa. 1929) ("The laws of the United States are found in ... treaties ... and international
law .. "); Waite v. The Antelope, 28 F. Cas. 1341, 1341 (D.C.D. S. Car. 1807) (No. 17,045)
("courts... [in this country ... are bound, by the Constitution of the United States, to deter-
mine according to treaties and the law of nations, wherever they apply"); United States v. The
Ariadne, 24 F. Cas. 851, 856 (D.C.D. Pa. 1812) (No. 14,465) ("the laws of the United States (the
laws of nations being included in them)"); Zamora-Trevino v. Barton, 727 F.Supp. 589, 591 (D.
Kan. 1989) ("laws of the United States (international law)"); Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F.Supp. 389,
414 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Demjanjuk); Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 626 F.Supp. 13, 27 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) ("international law is a part of the laws of the United States"); United States v. Crews, 605
F.Supp. 730, 734 n.1 (S.D. Fla 1985) ("is incorporated into the law of the United States");
Lareau v. Manson, 507 F.Supp. 1188 n.9 ("customary international law is part of the law of the
United States"); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F.Supp. 375, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(courts "have the obligation to respect and enforce international law .. .because international
law is a part of the law of the United States"); I Op. Att'y Gen. 566, 570-71 (1822) ("the laws of
the country"); supra notes 14, 32, 38; infra notes 45-48, 50, 52, 54-57; Dickinson, The Law of
Nations as Part of the Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 55-56 (1952); Goodwin,
supra note 34, at 161; Jay, supra note 14, at 826 (citing Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law (pt.
1), 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1040-53 (1985)); T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITA-
RIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 114 (1989) (customary international law "is a part of the law
of the United States"); cf. Trimble, supra note 7, at 677 (downplaying the significance of custom-
ary international law although conceding that it is a part of U.S. law); but see Caperton v. Bow-
yer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 228 (argument of counsel: "international law ... can give this court no
jurisdiction. The law of nations is not embodied in any provision of the Constitution .. " Cf.
id.: "It is true that the courts of the United States ... recognize the law of nations as binding
upon them .... ); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1089 (5th Cir. 1980) (although
"international law is a factor suggesting that a search or seizure is reasonable within the meaning
of the fourth amendment," a violation "may yet be both constitutional and permissible under the
laws of the United States," also citing United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 884 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979) (re: non-self-executing treaty), but see id. at 1093-94 (Rubin, J.,
dissenting)); Weisburd, supra note 15, at 1215 n.44, passim (ignoring this set of early opinions of
Supreme Court Justices and Founders despite his proclaiming that such statements "closest in
time to the drafting of the Constitution would seem most likely to reflect the obligation the
Framers intended .. " Id. at 1210). For apt criticism of Professor Weisburd's reasoning, see
Jay, supra note 14, at 830-33. In Republica v. DeLongchamps there had been use of the related
phrases "the law of this state" and "part of the municipal law." I U.S. (I Dall.) 1, 113, 115 (Pa.
1784). In Commonwealth v. Schaffer, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) xxvi (Mayor's Ct. of Phila. 1797), Inger-
soll and Thomas had argued that a breach of neutrality contrary to the law of nations and a
treaty was also "against the constitution of the United States," though not resulting from an act
of Congress. Id. at xxxi. And in Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, counsel had argued that if a
Congressional resolution confers a "confiscation" it "is unconstitutional because it violates inter-
national law." 270 U.S. 215, 219 (1926).
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tional law also arise under 'the laws of the United States,' since inter-
national law is 'part of our law'. . . and is federal law."' 45 Thus, cases
"arising under customary international law" are "within the Judicial
Power of the United States under Article III, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion;' '46 and such law, "while not mentioned explicitly in the
Supremacy Clause," is supreme federal law within the meaning of Ar-
ticle VI, clause 2.47 For these reasons, the phrase "laws. . of the
United States," contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 gives the district courts
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 111 Reporters' note 4. See also id., Comment e; id.,
§ 702 Comment c; Zamora-Trevino v. Barton, 727 F.Supp. at 591; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672
F.Supp. 1531, 1544 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Charney, supra note 15, at 919; Dickinson, supra note 44,
at 55-56; Goodwin, supra note 34, at 159-61, 164 n.35, 166, 172; Hartman, supra note 14, at 662;
Lillich, supra note 19, at 70; Randall, supra note 37, at 351 & n.14; Schneebaum, supra note 31,
at 74, 77; supra notes 38, 44 and accompanying text; infra note 46 and accompanying text; but
see Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F.Supp. 1452 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (an opinion also in error in
several other respects. See, e.g., Paust, Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, forthcoming).
Use of the phrase "law of the land" is also informative. See, e.g., infra notes 56-57 and accompa-
nying text; Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 6 (1887) (argument of counsel); Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 536-38 (1839) (argument of counsel); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 388, 422 (1815) (argument of counsel); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d
Cir. 1980); The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 732 (S.D. N.Y. 1918); United States v. Enger, 472 F.Supp.
490, 504 (D.N.J. 1978); United States v. Melekh, 190 F.Supp. 67, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Bergman
v. De Sieyes, 71 F.Supp. 334, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792); A. HAMIL-
TON, PACIFICUS No. 1 (June 29, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 34 (H.
Syrett ed. 1969); Jefferson, Letter as Secretary of State to French Minister Genet (June 5, 1793)
(law of nations is "integral part" of law of the land), extract in 1 J. MOORE, supra note 19, at 10;
Memorandum for the United States at 21, Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090);
see also Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 447 (1838); Bilder, Integrating International
Human Rights Law into Domestic Law - U.S. Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 2, 4, 6 (1981);
Jay, supra note 14, at 826; but see Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 369 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting)
("international law... though a part of our municipal law, is not a part of the organic law of the
land"), limited, 354 U.S. 1 (1956). Such a phrase had been used also with respect to treaties. See,
e.g., Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366, 372 (1857); Strother, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 439;
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828); Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82
AM J. INT'L L. 760 (1988).
46. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 111 Comment e. See also id., Reporter's Note 4; id.,
§ 702 Comment c; Goodwin, supra note 34, at 161; Henkin, supra note 34, at 1566; Preyer,
Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes in the
Early Republic, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 223, 232 (1986) ("law of nations" was "within the federal
judicial power.. .within the language of Article III..."); Palmer, The Federal Common Law of
CrIme, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. at 276-78; Schneebaum, The Enforceability of Customary Norms of
Public International Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 289, 290-91, 302 (1982); Steinhardt, supra
note 10, at 1135 n.134, 1175; Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.)
(our judicial tribunals "are established... to decide on human rights"); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 885-87 (2d. Cir. 1980); United States v. Buck, 690 F.Supp. at 1297; Gibbons v.
Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F.Supp. 1094, 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Letter from George Masson to
Arthur Lee (May 21, 1787), 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 24 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911) ("The most prevalent idea [was] to establish... a judiciary system with cogni-
zance of all such matters as depend upon the law of nations .... ); supra note 44; but see Trim-
ble, supra note 28, at 838, 840 (citing Trimble, supra note 7, at 717-23).
47. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § Il1 Comment d. See also F. BOYLE, supra note 24, at
31-32; Henkin, supra note 34, at 1566 ("fits comfortably" within the phrase "the laws of the
United States..."); Hartman, supra note 14, at 662; Jay, supra note 14, at 830-33; Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 886-87; cf Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 192 (1892); Ker v. Illinois, 119
U.S. 436, 444 (1886); state court opinions cited in Paust, supra note 32, at 618-20.
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original jurisdiction over all civil cases arising under customary inter-
national law, 48 whether or not other statutes, such as the Alien Tort
Statute,49 refer expressly to the "law of nations" or to customary inter-
national law.
For these reasons also, customary international law has been di-
rectly incorporable, at least for civil sanction purposes, without the
need for some other (or any) statutory base. 50 Indeed, direct incorpo-
ration by the Supreme Court, at least while exercising its original juris-
diction, can rest on Articles III and VI alone. While customary
international law had also been directly incorporable for criminal
sanctions and such is still theoretically possible, the matter is not be-
yond dispute.51 Another form of direct incorporation has also recog-
48. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 111 Comment e. See also 13B C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3563 (2d ed. 1984); Randall, supra
note 37; Schneebaum, supra note 46, at 303; Steinhardt, supra note 10, at 1174 n.303; supra notes
38, 44, 46.
49. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 1976). See also 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58-59 (1795).
50. See, e.g., H. HANNUM, supra note 25, at 6; Bilder, supra note 45; Henkin, The Constitu-
tion and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 853, 868 n.70, 870 n.73, 873 & n.90, 874 (1987); Henkin, supra note 34, at 1561; Lillich,
supra note 19, at 69-70; Paust, supra note 32, at 618-620, 620-23 n.501; Paust, Human Rights:
From Jurisprudential Inquiry to Effective Litigation (Book Review), 56 N.Y.U. L.REv. 227, 233,
236, 240-42, 244 (1981); Schneebaum, supra note 46, at 291-93, 302-03, 307; Strossen, supra note
19, at 815, 818-19, 822; Duponceau, quoted in Henfield's Case, I F. Cas. 1099, 1122 n.6 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1793) ("law of nations.. .acts everywhere proprio rigore'); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1980); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F.Supp. 787, 795-96, 798-800 (D. Kan.
1980); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299-300, 310 (1865) ("[T]he laws of war... [l]ike the other laws of
nations.., exist and are of binding force upon the departments and citizens of the Government,
though not defined by any law of Congress."); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797) ("Congress has
passed no act yet" but individuals are "still liable to be prosecuted"); Memorandum for the
United States in Filartiga, supra note 19, at 21. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § I I 1 (1),
(2), (3) and Reporters' Note 4; supra notes 38, 44-48; infra notes 53-57. But see United States v.
Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066,
1068-69 (9th Cir. 1990)); The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925); Hunt v. BP
Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd., 492 F.Supp. 885, 903 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (quoting Dreyfus v.
Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976) (an opinion that was
wrong and specifically disapproved later in Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880, 887)); Kalmich v. Bruno,
450 F.Supp. 227, 229 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (same); Arroyo v. The M/V Island Queen II, 259 F.Supp.
15, 16 (1966); Maier, supra note 10, at 462 ("where"), 472 ("only when"); supra note 10. On the
"only where" error, see Paust, supra note 1, at 436-39 & n.90; American Baptist Churches in the
U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F.Supp. 756, 771 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
51. See Paust, Congress and Genocide: They're Not Going to Get Away With It, I I MICH. J.
INT'L L. 90, 103 (1989); Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and
Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State
Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 219-20 (1983) [hereinafter Paust, Federal Jurisdiction]; The
Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 53 (1897); United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467, 468
(1826) (indictment under statute & law of nations); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133, 159-61
(1795); United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 296, 298-99 (1793); Respublica v.
DeLongchamps, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 111, 113, 115-16 (1784); United States v. Liddle, 26 F. Cas. 936
(C.C.D. Pa. 1808) (No. 15,598) (statute & law of nations); United States v. Hand, 26 F. Cas. 103,
104 (C.C.D. Pa. 1810) (No. 15,297) (statute & law of nations); Henfield's Case, I I F. Cas. at
1102-05 (Jay, C.J.), 1105-09 (Wilson, J.), 1120 & n.6 (Wilson, J.); Morris v. United States, 161 F.
672, 675 (8th Cir. 1908) (dictum); 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 249, 250-51 (1873); l Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69
(1797); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792); U.S. Dep't Army, Field Manual No. 27-10, The Law of
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nizably enhanced and/or limited the jurisdiction of courts under
customary principles of jurisdictional competence because such com-
petencies and requirements under international law, being also law of
the United States, are relevant to full inquiry about federal court
jurisdiction.5 2
Since international law is law of the United States in several senses
Land Warfare 180-81, para. 505(e) (1956). See also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
153, 159 (1820) ("But supposing Congress were bound in all cases... to define" - implication:
Congress may not have to define); Jay, supra note 14, at 829 & n.53, 843-44. Interestingly, since
offenses under customary international laws are among the "laws of the United States" (see supra
notes 44-46), federal courts have been granted jurisdiction over "all [such] offenses" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231.
52. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 598 (1927) (argument of counsel); United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922); In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 491 (1892); Demjanjuk
v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The law of the United States includes
international law" and such "law recognizes 'universal jurisdiction' over certain offenses."), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d
421, 425, 428 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989); United States v. Ro-
mero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1154 (1 th Cir. 1985); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316
(11th Cir. 1984); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Kaercher, 720 F.2d 5, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255,
257-58 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983); Industrial Investment Development
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 671 F.2d 876, 884 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983);
Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 787 & n.57 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1128 (1981); F. T. C. v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1313-
18 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 308-09 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied sub nom., Sarmiento v. U.S., 444 U.S. 1014 (1980); United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808,
811 (4th Cir. 1977, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); Fiocconi v. Attorney General of the United
States, 462 F.2d 475, 479-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); United States v. Piz-
zarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); Rivard v. United States, 375
F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1967);
Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 571 (5th Cir. 1952); Chandler v. United States,
171 F.2d 921, 930 (1st Cir. 1948) (quoting United States v. Bowman, supra); Horwitz v. United
States, 63 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 1933) (Sibley, J., concurring); United States v. Yunis, 681
F.Supp. 896, 899-903, 906 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F.Supp. 246, 253-54 (D.C. 1985); United
States v. Keller, 451 F.Supp. 631, 634-35 (D.P.R. 1978); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F.Supp.
479, 489, 491 (S.D. Cal. 1960), rev'd in part sub nom., Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961); Paust, Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 51, at 199-200 &
n.32, 201 n.38 (cases). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 431(a) Comment a, 433, Com-
ment c, Reporters' Note 3, 471 Comment b, 472, Reporter's Note 2; The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362, 370-71 (1824) (customary limits on executive enforcement jurisdiction); United
States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 834 (1988); Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. Ma-
rino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380-83 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 685 F.2d 1389 (1982), cert. denied
sub nom., Pauth-Arzuza v. United States, 459 U.S. 1114 (1983); United States v. Toscanino, 500
F.2d 267, 276-79 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (1974); United States v. Robins, 27 F.
Cas. at 865 (append.) (Rep. Marshall); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Kasser, 391 F.Supp.
1167, 1174-75 (D.N.J. 1975); but see United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 n.1 (9th Cir.
1990) (dictum) (citing United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1990)(dictum
and discloses why nationality jurisdiction applied)); United States v. Biermann, 678 F.Supp.
1437, 1445 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (dictum and discloses why protective jurisdiction applied - id. at
1444-45) (citing Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1914) (citation irrelevant because
court addressed a treaty as opposed to custom and there was no clash with customary interna-
tional law as to jurisdiction) and United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983)
(dictum)); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F.Supp. 1021, 1032 (N.D. Ohio
1981) (dictum) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1001 (5th Cir. 1977) (actually
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noted above, the judiciary also has the power to take judicial notice of
and, thus, to identify and clarify customary international law. 51 More
importantly, such points compel recognition that the judiciary is
bound to identify, clarify and apply customary international law in
cases or controversies otherwise properly before the courts. As Justice
Gray recognized in The Paquete Habana:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and admin-
istered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.
54
Similarly, in Hilton v. Guyot, he affirmed:
International law in its widest and most comprehensive sense... is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts
of justice, as often as such questions are presented in litigation between
man and man, duly submitted to their determination.
The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of such questions
is a treaty or a statute of this country. But when, as is the case here,
there is no written law upon the subject, the duty still rests upon the
judicial tribunals of ascertaining and declaring what the law is, whenever
it becomes necessary to do so in order to determine the rights of parties
to suits regularly brought before them.
55
Other recognitions of such a judicial obligation have existed through-
out our early history, 56 and have found expression in more recent fed-
improper as cite because statement that "international law principles do not constrain" was made
because they were not violated and nationality jurisdiction applied)).
53. See, e.g., Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church, 210 U.S. 296, 318 (1908)
("international law... courts must take judicial notice"); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708
(1899) ("bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to, [even] in the absence of any treaty
or other public act of their own government..."); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886)
("bound to take notice"); Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. (I Otto) 37, 42 (1875); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1871) ("we may take judicial notice... [of] the law of nations"); The Kaiser
Wilhelm II, 230 F. at 723 ("International law is something of which courts will take notice");
Ocean Ins. Co. v. Francis, 2 Wend. 64, 69 (N.Y. 1828); RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 113(1)
and Comment b. See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27 (1942) ("[flrom the very beginning of
its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war..."); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 163 (1894); Crosby v. Pacific S.S. Lines, 133 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1943) ("It is clear...
that the federal courts would have applied any rule of international law bearing on the point, or
the provisions of a treaty."); 1 J. MOORE, supra note 19, at 11; supra notes 14, 38; cf Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428, 430 n.34 (1964) (adding: "the greater the
degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more
appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus
on the application of an agreed principle"). On the meaning of Sabbatino, compare Rabinowitz,
Viva Sabbatino, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 697 (1977) with Paust, supra note 4.
54. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899) (Gray, J., opinion) (emphasis added). See
also id. at 708 ("bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to .. " (emphasis added)).
For further exposition, see Paust, supra note 1, at 435-39, and references cited; United States v.
Buck, 690 F.Supp. 1291, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
55. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1894) (Gray, J., opinion) (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 6 (1886) (argument of counsel: "is obligatory
upon the courts of the United States."); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) ("bound to take
notice"); Caperton v. Bowyer, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 216, 228 (quoted in note 44 supra); Bank of
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eral opinions. 7  Indeed, because of such a judicial duty and
responsibility, based as it is in the Constitution, 58 a court that refuses
for some specious reason to apply international law denies its own
validity.
59
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 536 (1839) (argument of counsel: "law of nations...
binding and obligatory upon courts of justice"); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422-23
(1815) ("court is bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of the land"); Talbot v.
Seeman, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1, 44 (1801) ("our duty to believe" legislature will always hold cus-
tomary principles sacred); The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103, 110 (1801); The Resolu-
tion, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 19, 33 (Fed. Ct. App. 1781) (courts have duty to administer "the law of
nations dispassionately and righteously"); The Newfoundland, 89 F. 510, 512 (D. S.C. 1898)
(quoting Sir William Scott: "duty... to administer with indifference that justice which the law of
nations holds out .. "); In re Ezeta, 62 F. 964, 968 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (quoting Kerr v. Illinois,
119 U.S. 436 (1886)); United States v. The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1885)
("court is bound to apply... international law"); In re Waite, 28 F. Cas. 1339, 1341 (1868)
(quoted in note 44 supra); RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 111(3) ("bound to give effect to");
Hopner v. Appleby, 12 F. Cas. 522, 523 (C.C.D. R.I. 1828) (No. 6,699) ("bound to recognize and
enforce"); Clark v. United States, 5 F. Cas. 932, 933 (C.C.D. Pa. 1811) (No. 2,838) (argument of
counsel: "obligatory, as a rule of decision, upon courts"); see also The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)
28, 57 (1866) (quoted in note 14 supra); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 556
(1857) (McLean, J., dissenting) ("cannot be abrogated by judicial decisions"); Strother v. Lucas,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 436-37, 439 (1838) (private right acquired by custom "is as inviolable as if
founded on a written law" and duty to apply treaties); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241,
276-77 (1808) (quoted in note 14 supra); The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
("can never be construed to violate.., rights... further than is warranted by the law of na-
tions .... ); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 237 ("National or federal judges are bound by
duty and oath to the same conduct" as state judges re: international law), 276 (1796); Russell v.
Forty Bales Cotton, 21 F. Cas. 42, 45 (D.C.S.D. Fla. 1872) (No. 12,154) (courts are "bound to
recognize" and apply "the general maritime law of nations").
57. See, e.g., Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church, 210 U.S. 296, 318 (1908)
(quoted in note 53, supra); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting The
Nereide 13 U.S. (9 Crunch) 388 (1815)); Fiocconi v. Attorney General of the United States, 462
F.2d 475, 479 n.7 (2d Cir. 1972); Hempel v. Weedin, 23 F.2d 949, 952 (W.D. Wash. 1928)
(quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1894)); The Lusitania, 251 F. 715, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1918)
("The United States courts recognize the binding force of international law."); The Appam, 234
F. 389, 401 (E.D. Va. 1916) ("duty of administering the law of nations."); United States v.
Kakwirakeron, 730 F.Supp. 1200, 1202 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Buck, 690 F.Supp.
1291, 1297, 1299-1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627 F.Supp. 13, 26-7 (E.D.N.Y.
1983); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F.Supp. 487, 798-99 (D. Kan. 1980) ("federal courts are
bound to ascertain and administer in appropriate cases..." and, when faced with a governmental
violation, are "bound to declare such an abuse and to order its cessation."); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F.Supp. 375, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("obligation to respect and enforce
international law"), 386; United States v. Melekh, 190 F.Supp. 67, 85 (S.D.N.Y 1960) ("bound to
recognize and apply the Law of Nations"); Evangelinos v. Andreavapor CIA. NAV., S.A., 188
F.Supp. 794, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ("federal courts are bound by international law"); See also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 113 Comment b; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
at 450-51 (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 159 (1932); Thompson v.
Lucas, 252 U.S. 358, 359 (1920) (argument of counsel: "part of the law of the land and should be
followed by the courts of the United States."); United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165, 170 (6th
Cir. 1971) ("duty ... to apply. . .statutes, interpreted in the light of recognized principles of
international law."); H. HANNUM, supra note 25, at 4; Charney, supra note 15, at 919; Randall,
supra note 37, at 355; Strossen, supra note 19, at 820.
58. See text at notes 37, 44-47 supra and accompanying notes.
59. See also Paust, supra note 45, at 777 & n.101. The identification and clarification of




In conclusion, there are several important recognitions in U.S. ju-
dicial opinions concerning the nature, sources and status of customary
international law. Indeed, there are several constitutional bases which
are relevant to an adequate incorporation of customary international
law, and such law has been incorporated both directly and indirectly
for several purposes, including the recognition and/or conditioning of
rights, duties and powers.
As "law of the United States" within the meaning of several consti-
tutional provisions, customary international law is relevant both to the
restraint and to the enhancement of executive, congressional and judi-
cial powers. Indeed, under Article III, section 2, clause 1 and Article
VI, clause 2 of the Constitution, the judiciary is recognizably bound to
identify, clarify and apply customary international law in cases other-
wise properly before the courts, assuming that no unavoidable clash
with some other constitutional requirement otherwise exists. 6°
Finally, it is realistic to note that we are merely participants in the











60. See also Paust, supra note 1, at 394 n. I (U.S. Constitution should apply domestically in
the case of an unavoidable clash with custom).
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